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Abstract—After several years of research on onion routing,
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya, in an attempt at rigorous analysis,
defined an ideal functionality in the universal composability
model, together with properties that protocols have to meet
to achieve provable security. A whole family of systems based
their security proofs on this work. However, analyzing HORNET
and Sphinx, two instances from this family, we show that this
proof strategy is broken. We discover a previously unknown
vulnerability that breaks anonymity completely, and explain a
known one. Both should not exist if privacy is proven correctly.
In this work, we analyze and fix the proof strategy used for
this family of systems. After proving the efficacy of the ideal
functionality, we show how the original properties are flawed and
suggest improved, effective properties in their place. Finally, we
discover another common mistake in the proofs. We demonstrate
how to avoid it by showing our improved properties for one
protocol, thus partially fixing the family of provably secure onion
routing protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Anonymous communication protocols are developed to
protect communication meta data from surveillance. With
millions of users1 Tor [16] is the most widely known protocol to
restrict the information an adversary learns. It relies on the idea
of Onion Routing (OR) [21]. This generic approach removes the
relationship between a message and its corresponding sender
by forwarding the message over multiple proxies that modify
it at each hop.
With increasing importance of OR, the need to build
efficient protocols for low delay communication with proven
security guarantees became apparent. To simplify building those
protocols, Sphinx [13] was proposed as a secure packet format
for onions. Building on this format HORNET [11], among
others, was proposed for high-speed OR at the network layer.
Using multiple cryptographic techniques the authors both of
Sphinx and HORNET present proofs along the lines of the
strategy proposed by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya in [8].
This proof strategy is based on defining an ideal functionality
for OR2 in the universal composability (UC) model. The
functionality is an abstraction to show which information even
a perfect OR scheme leaks to an adversary. The authors in
addition design protocol properties. Proving that a real world
protocol complies with these properties, they claim, implies
‡ This work in parts was carried out while affiliated with TU Dresden.
1according to https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html
2Understanding of OR varied in the field. To be compliant with the
terms of [8], we understand OR in this work as a free-route Chaumian
MixNet [10] without requiring that messages are delayed. This conforms with
the understanding of [21] and [16] except that circuits are excluded.
the security and privacy of their ideal OR functionality. This
convenient proof scheme has been used to analyze the privacy
of a whole family of recent, efficient packet formats (e.g. the
improved Minx [30] and Sphinx [13]) and OR protocols (e.g.
HORNET [11] and TARANET [12]).
Analyzing HORNET, we discovered a simple attack on its
data transmission phase that allows it to link senders to receivers
and large parts of the messages to their senders as well. Our
attack complies to HORNET’s adversary model and should
have been detected when proving its security. We found that
similar attacks are to some extent possible on related work [12],
[13], [30]. In addition, there is a padding flaw in Sphinx [13],
luckily detected and corrected in the implementation3, that has
escaped the formal analysis. Undetected, this flaw would have
jeopardized the privacy of the senders in systems using Sphinx.
As all the protocols prove privacy based on the ideal
functionality and properties of [8], attacks threatening the users’
privacy should not be possible in the final protocol. We thus
set out to identify and correct the mistakes in the process. As it
turns out, there are multiple open questions and discrepancies
that have to be solved for the proof strategy.
First, no one ever analyzed the privacy this ideal OR
functionality actually achieves, to start with. Many papers [1],
[3], [4], [6], [15], [17]–[19], [27]–[29], [31] citing it disagree
violently on this point. As our first contribution towards solving
the matter, we analyze the ideal functionality. We show that
it indeed implies the privacy goals expected for OR, namely
sender anonymity and relationship anonymity, against a limited
yet useful adversary model.
Next, we look closer at the attack on Sphinx and realize the
first mistake: The properties proposed to imply the privacy of
the ideal functionality are not sufficient. Proving the original
properties thus does not provide any privacy guarantee. Having
a closer look at the properties, we discover that one of them
is inexact, a second missing important aspects, and the last
two lack to provide any additional privacy. To understand
what exactly is missing, we construct two obviously broken
protocols that still fulfill the properties. Based on our insights
from the broken protocols, we construct two new properties,
Tail-Indistinguishability and Layer-Unlinkability, and prove
that they, together with the correction of the inexact property,
indeed imply the privacy of the analyzed ideal functionality.
3https://github.com/UCL-InfoSec/sphinx/blob/
c05b7034eaffd8f98454e0619b0b1548a9fa0f42/SphinxClient.py#L67
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Thus, they allow to prove privacy with the convenient strategy
of showing that a protocol meets the improved properties.
By reconsidering our new attack on HORNET, we uncover an
independent second mistake: The properties of Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya have not been proven correctly for the protocols.
More precisely, the oracles used in the original definition of
the properties have been ignored or weakened.
Finally, we demonstrate how to perform an analysis for
our new properties, by proving that a variation of Sphinx [5],
which improves performance but neglects replies, has (with the
small additional correction to the padding flaw known from the
Sphinx implementation) the privacy of the ideal functionality.
By solving the issues, it turns out that the model behind
the ideal functionality does neither support anonymous reply
packets, nor sessions – which are frequently adapted in above
papers. The privacy for these extensions cannot be proven
using the given ideal functionality. In this work, we favor a
rigorous treatment of the foundations, i.e. sending a message
to a receiver, over extensions like sessions and reply channels.
We conjecture that with the solid foundation given in this paper
the issues of sessions and replies can be solved in future work
by adapting the functionality and properties.
Our main contributions are: (a) a privacy analysis of the ideal
functionality of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya; (b) a rigorous
analysis of the original properties; (c) the design of improved
properties that provably achieve the ideal functionality; (d)
a new attack on HORNET, that similarly is possible on the
improved Minx (and in slight violation of their models, on
TARANET and Sphinx); (e) demonstrations of flaws in the
privacy proofs of the above named formats and systems; (f) a
demonstration how to prove the corrected properties.
Outline: We first introduce the background, then analyze
the ideal functionality, followed by the explanation of the
Sphinx flaw and original properties. After this we show
weaknesses of the original properties, construct new properties
and prove them secure. Next, we explain the new HORNET
attack and the flaw in the proofs. Finally, we prove a variation
of Sphinx private, discuss our findings and conclude the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
This section explains the adversary model, OR and selected
existing systems based on OR. We further introduce the formal
proof strategy [8] and the used privacy definitions [25].
For explaining OR, we consider the scenario of whistleblower
Alice who wants to leak sensitive information to media agent
Bob and uses open anonymization systems (like Tor) to hide
from a regime that deploys mass surveillance.
A. Adversary Model
Assuming a nation state adversary we have to expect a
global attacker with full control over the Internet infrastructure.
This entails the possibility to observe all links and to actively
drop, delay, modify, and insert packets on any link. Given
the open nature of anonymization systems, the adversary can
easily provide a large subset of nodes, which seemingly run the
anonymization system, but are really under her full control. She
hence knows all secret keys of those nodes, and she can modify,
drop, and insert packets at each of them. Even the receivers
are untrusted and considered potentially under control of the
adversary, and as the system is open, the adversary may also act
as one or a set of senders, seemingly using the anonymization
system parallel to Alice. We assume full collusion between all
adversarial parties, but follow the common assumption that the
attacker is limited to probabilistic polynomial time algorithms
(PPT). These assumptions are common for onion routing, and
they correspond to the model in [8].
B. Onion Routing (OR)
Considering the scenario, sending her message to Bob, the
journalist, Alice requires that both Bob and the regime shall
not learn that she was the individual sending the message.
Given the existence of a trusted proxy, she can encrypt her
message with the public key of the proxy and send it there, to
be decrypted and forwarded to Bob on her behalf. Her identity
then is hidden in the set of all users that communicate over this
proxy at the same time. The set of these users is commonly
called her anonymity set.
Given the open nature of the system, Alice cannot trust
any single proxy completely. She hence chooses a chain of
proxies, hoping that one of the proxies is honest and does not
collaborate with the adversary. To hide the mapping between the
packets that arrive at and depart from a proxy, she consecutively
encrypts the packet for each of the proxies on the chain, and
includes a header signaling where to forward the packet next.
Each proxy locally decrypts and forwards the packet. The last
proxy decrypts it to the original message and forwards it to
Bob.
As the packet is encrypted in several layers that consecutively
are removed, the scheme is commonly called onion encryption.
The proxies hence often are called onion routers, or relays.
Decrypting at the relays yields the intermediate header
and a shorter onion for the next relay. Corresponding length
reductions of the onions would leak information that the
adversary could use to link observed packets arriving and
departing at an honest relay. Onions hence are usually padded
to a fixed length that is globally known, which restricts the
maximum length of the payload as well as the number of relays
on the path that can be addressed. We therefore assume the
maximum path length N in terms of hops between an honest
sender and a receiver.
Assumption 1: The OR protocol has a maximum path length
of N .
Protection in OR follows from hiding the link between
incoming and outgoing onions at a relay. Should the adversary
by chance control all proxies that are chosen for an onion, she
can trivially reversely link outgoing to incoming onions for
all relays, and hence identify Alice as the original sender of
a message delivered to Bob. As the path is chosen by Alice
who actively aims to remain anonymous towards Bob and the
regime, she will pick a path solely containing corrupted relays
only rarely, by mistake. We therefore, deem it suitable to add
the following assumption for our analysis:
Assumption 2: There is at least one honest relay on the
chosen path, if the sender is honest.
Further, as the adversary can actively insert packets, she
can replay the same onion at the honest relay and observe the
same behavior twice. OR protocols hence usually implement a
replay protection, by detecting and dropping replayed onions.
For an easier analysis, we limit our scope to replay protection
mechanisms that drop onions that have already been processed:
Assumption 3: The replay protection, if one is used, drops
bit-identical onions.
C. Network Model
Onion Routing can be used in two different modes: the
receiver participating in the anonymization protocol, or not.
The first case considers an integrated system to be set up
for anonymous communication. The receiver will act as an
onion router and, while processing an onion, discover that
it is intended for herself. In the second case messages are
anonymized as a service and the receiver is unaware of the
anonymization happening. The last router, called exit node,
discovers that the message needs to be forwarded outside the
anonymization network to reach its receiver.
D. Existing Schemes and Systems
Danezis and Goldberg [13] define Sphinx, a packet format for
secure OR. Sphinx’s goals are to provide bitwise unlinkability
between onion layers before and after an honest node, resistance
against all active tagging attacks to learn the destination or
content of a message, and space efficiency. Hiding the number
of hops an onion already traveled, and the indistinguishability
of both forward onions as well as response onions on a reply
channel were considered to further strengthen privacy. Their
network model assumes anonymization services, and their
adversary model mainly matches the above description. Traffic
analysis, flooding or denial of service are however excluded.
Tagging attacks, i.e. an adversary modifying onions before
reinjecting them, on the other hand are explicitly allowed.
Sphinx’s onion layers consist of a header that contains all
path information except the receiver, and a payload that contains
the protected message and protected receiver address. Padding
and multiple cryptographic primitives are used for construction
and processing of onions, but the integrity of the payload at
each layer is not protected by Sphinx as this would conflict
with their support for replies. Tampering with the payload is
only recognized at the exit node. As security proof, Danezis
and Goldberg prove the properties of [8] for Sphinx.
Predecessors to Sphinx were Minx [14] and its fixed
version [30]. Like Sphinx, neither of the two protects the
integrity of the payload at the relays. Beato et al. proposed
a variant of Sphinx [5] that neglects replies and replaces the
cryptographic primitives to increase performance and security,
and thereby protects the integrity of the payload at each relay.
Subsequent to the work on packet formats, Chen et al.
proposed the protocol HORNET [11] as a high-speed, highly
scalable anonymity system for the network layer. The authors
claim that HORNET protects the anonymity of Alice against
a slightly restricted adversary compared to our attacker: The
attacker does actively control a fraction of the relays (including
the receiver), but corruption of links is not explicitly mentioned.
Further, traffic analysis attacks are excluded as in the case of
Sphinx. They assume an integrated anonymization network
including the receiver. HORNET distinguishes between a setup
phase and a transmission phase. It adapts Sphinx for the
setup phase to create an anonymous header that allows for
routing data in the subsequent transmission phase. Multiple
cryptographic primitives are used in the construction and
processing of packets in both phases. Similar to Sphinx,
HORNET’s data transmission phase does not protect the
integrity of the payload at each relay. Further, at every relay
the payload is decrypted with a block cipher in CBC mode.
Extending HORNET to protect against partially stronger
adversaries, TARANET [12] bases its setup on Sphinx as
well. Additionally, it proposes packet-splitting as a traffic-
shaping technique to withstand some traffic-analysis. Therefore,
however, shared trust between sender and receiver is presumed.
The privacy of HORNET’s and TARANET’s setup phase
is claimed to follow from Sphinx. The privacy of their
data transmission phase is proven following the same proof
technique from [8], similar as in the improved Minx [30] and
Sphinx.
E. Formally treating OR
Towards rigorous analysis of OR, Camenisch and Lysyan-
skaya [8] specified an ideal functionality in the UC framework
and defined properties to ease the analysis of OR protocols4.
1) UC Framework [9]: An ideal functionality in the UC
framework is an abstraction of a real protocol that expresses the
security and privacy properties as required in the real protocol.
Proving that the real protocol realizes the ideal functionality
implies proving that attacks on the real protocol do not reveal
anything to the adversary she would not learn from attacks on
the ideal functionality.
2) Formal OR Scheme: To model OR, [8] defines an Onion
Routing Scheme as the set of three algorithms:
• Key generation algorithm G: (PK,SK) ← G(1λ, p, P )
with public key PK, secret key SK, security parameter
λ, public parameter p and router name P
• Sending algorithm FormOnion: (O1, ..., On+1) ←
FormOnion(m, (P1, . . . , Pn+1), (PK1, . . . , PKn+1))
with Oi being the onion layer to process by router Pi, m
the message, and PKi the public key belonging to router
Pi
• Forwarding algorithm ProcOnion: (O′, P ′) ←
ProcOnion(SK,O, P ) with O′ the processed onion that
is forwarded to P ′ and P the router processing O with
secret key SK. O′ and P ′ attains ⊥ in case of error or
if P is the recipient.
4Although designed for the integrated system model, it applies to the service
model as well (except for renaming recipient to exit node) if no protection
outside of the OR protocol exists. There the ideal functionality however only
considers the anonymization network and additional private information might
leak when the packet is sent from the exit node to the receiver.
3) Properties: [8] defines three security properties for
OR schemes and proves that those imply realizing their
ideal OR functionality, i.e. being private and secure. Later
works [11]–[13] split one of the properties in two. The resulting
four properties are Onion-Correctness, Onion-Integrity, Onion-
Security and Wrap-Resistance:
Onion-Correctness requires that all messages use the in-
tended path and reach the intended receiver in absence of an
adversary. Onion-Integrity limits the number of honest relays
that any onion (even one created by the adversary) can traverse.
Onion-Security states that an adversary observing an onion
departing from an honest sender and being routed to an honest
relay, cannot distinguish whether this onion contains adversarial
chosen inputs or a random message for the honest relay. The
adversary is even allowed to observe the processing of other
onions at the honest relay via an oracle. Wrap-Resistance
informally means that an adversary cannot create an onion
that after processing at a relay equals an onion she previously
observed as an output at another relay, even if she has full
control over the inputs.
F. Analysis Framework
We use the framework of Kuhn et al. [25] that unifies the
privacy goals of existing theoretical analysis frameworks like
AnoA [2] and others [7], [20], [22]. It introduces a well-
analyzed hierarchy of privacy goals and thus allows our analysis
results for OR to be easily comparable.
1) Privacy Goals: The idea of the analysis follows game-
based security-proofs. It challenges an adversary to distinguish
two simulations of the protocol that differ only in protected
parts of the communications (e.g. who the sender of a certain
message was). Each communication in this context contains a
sender, receiver, message and auxiliary information, like, for our
purpose, the path included in the onion. The communications
input for the two simulations are called scenarios. They are
freely chosen by the adversary to reflect the worst case. Privacy
notions specify formally in which elements the scenarios are
allowed to differ, or, in other words, which information has to
be protected by the protocol.
Four privacy notions are of specific interest when analyzing
OR. The first is a strong form of confidentiality: The adversary
is unable to decide which of two self-chosen messages was
sent in the simulation. As thus the message is unobservable,
this notion is called Message Unobservability (MO).
The second corresponds to our example above, and is a
form of sender anonymity: Informally speaking, the adversary
is unable to decide, which of the messages that she provided
is sent by which of the senders that she chose. As thus she
cannot link the sender to its message, this notion is called
Sender-Message Unlinkability (SML).
The third, conversely, is a form of receiver anonymity: The
adversary is unable to decide, which of the messages that she
provided is received by which of the receivers that she chose.
As thus she cannot link the receiver to its message, this notion
is called Receiver-Message Unlinkability (RML).
The fourth is a form of relationship anonymity: The adversary
is unable to decide which pairs of two self-chosen senders and
two self-chosen receivers communicate with each other. As
thus she cannot link the sender to the receiver, this notion is
called Sender-Receiver Unlinkability (SRL).5
2) Adversary: All the privacy notions can be analyzed
for different user (sender and receiver) corruption. Therefore,
options for user corruption are defined and added to the
abbreviation of privacy notion X:
X0: no users are corrupted, but some relays or links can be,
Xs: only receivers, relays, and links can be corrupted, but no
senders,
Xe: senders, receivers, relays, and links can be corrupted (some
limitations apply to prevent the adversary to trivially win
the game)
The framework introduces adversary classes as part of the
game, known to the adversary. They specify modifications of
the input from, as well as the output to the adversary. Their
purpose is to fine-tune the adversary capabilities e.g. to make
sure that Assumption 2 is met in the scenarios the adversary
is challenged to distinguish.
3) Relation of Goals: Analyzing OR we are interested in
determining the strongest notion that it achieves. The analysis
in the framework then allows statements even for notions that
are not directly analyzed, as it proves a hierarchy: By showing
that a certain notion is achieved, all implied (weaker) notions
are shown to be achieved as well.
Given the claims in [8], [11], [13], we are specifically
interested in the above mentioned notions of sender- as well
as receiver-message unlinkability (SML and RML), which
each implies sender-receiver unlinkability (SRL), and the
independent message unobservability (MO) , as highlighted
red in Fig. 1 (the exact definition of the notions are described
in Appendix B1).
Receiver Privacy Notions Sender Privacy Notions
Both-side
Unlinkability
Sender-
Receiver
Linkability
Message
Observability
Sender-Message Linkability
Sender Observability
Receiver-Message Linkability
Receiver Observability
Impartial Notions
bservability
Fig. 1. Excerpt of the hierarchy of [25]
III. ANALYZING THE IDEAL OR FUNCTIONALITY
There indeed is confusion about which privacy the ideal
functionality F of [8] actually guarantees. The work itself
states only that “its not hard to see that Z [the environment, a
construct of the UC Framework that gets all observations of the
adversary] learns nothing else than pieces of paths of onions
5This notion is called (SR)L in [25].
formed by honest senders (i.e., does not learn a sub-path’s
position or relations among different sub-paths). Moreover, if
the sender and the receiver are both honest, the adversary does
not learn the message.”
[1], [3], [28], [29], [31] state that this translates to the degree
of anonymity Tor provides, although [15], [18] argue that it
is not applicable for Tor. [4] states that it “hide(s) the source
and destination over a network,” [27] even understood it as “a
concrete ZK proof of senders’ knowledge of their messages”
and [6] as “provable reduction from unlinkability to traffic
analysis.” [19] states that the privacy is “that an adversary
cannot correctly guess relations between incoming messages
and outgoing messages at onion routers, and [...] that each
onion router cannot know the whole route path of any onion.”
While [18] and [17] realize that the anonymity is not analyzed
and suspect it to be close to the one of [26], which claims to
have sender and receiver anonymity against a global passive
adversary [17].
We hence set out to analyze the actual privacy guarantees
of the ideal functionality.
A. Ideal Functionality F
Recall the basic idea of OR: an adversary can only track
the communication from the sender until the first honest relay.
After this she can no longer link the onion to the sender (or
the route before the honest relay). Further, any onion layer
does hide the included message and remaining path, as they
are encrypted.
The ideal functionality for OR of [8] therefore uses tem-
porary random IDs in place of onion packets. All network
information necessary to create onions (sender, receiver, path,
message, hopcount, a randomly chosen session ID) are stored
within the ideal functionality, inaccessible to the adversary.
Sending the onion along a path of relays is represented
by informing all relays about the temporary IDs of the
corresponding onions they receive. The temporary ID is
replaced with a new randomly drawn ID at every honest node.
The adversary in this model learns the temporary IDs on
links and at the corrupted relays, and if the receiver is corrupted
also the corresponding plaintext message. She specifically does
not learn which departing ID at an honest relay corresponds
to which received ID. The adversary however is allowed to
decide when an ID is delivered to the next relay (and thus
whether it is delivered at all), as she is assumed to control all
links.
Nitpicking, we add a small detail to the ideal functionality as
suggested by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya: The functionality
represents the case of an honest sender well. However, for a
corrupted sender the adversary trivially learns the complete path
and message as the sender chooses it. As no secure protocol
can remove information an adversary already knows, we add
that the functionality outputs all information about the onion
(sender, receiver, path, etc.) together with the temporary ID, if
its sender is corrupted. The ideal functionality is detailed in
Algorithm 1. Further, the description of [8] with highlighted
small changes is in Appendix A.
B. Analysis under Restricted Adversary Model
The ideal functionality was designed to capture the cryp-
tographic properties of onion routing. Therefore, it does not
protect against dropping or delaying onions. Hence, for this
analysis we need to exclude attacks that result in dropping or
delaying onions.6 Given this adversary model7 we are able to
prove the privacy goals expected for OR.
1) Instantiation of the Framework: As the path P is an
important input to an onion, we model it specified in the aux-
iliary information of a communication. The communications,
including the auxiliary information, are picked arbitrarily by
the adversary in the framework. Assumption 2 however requires
at least one honest relay to exist on the path for our analysis.
For this reason, we define the adversary class C to modify the
path: C replaces the paths as chosen by the adversary with
alternative paths, whenever an honest sender constructing the
onion. The replacements are chosen at random from the set
of paths with valid length that include at least one common
honest relay.
We further restrict the adversary to be incapable of timing-
based traffic analysis. Hence, in the traffic analysis restricted
adversary class C the adversary must not use any timing
information about the onion, i.e. the adversary class shuffles all
the outputs from the ideal functionality for communications that
are processed together before handing them to the adversary.
Since the adversary is incapable of traffic analysis, the adversary
class prohibits to delay packets. To further prohibit replay
attacks, which we consider as special kind of traffic analysis
attack, the adversary class drops any duplicated deliver requests
from the adversary.
2) Analysis: Recall, the ideal functionality only outputs the
message to the adversary for a corrupted receiver or sender.
So, the message is protected if sender and receiver are honest
or corrupted users get the same messages in both scenarios
(limitation in Xe) and confidentiality MO is achieved.
Due to the adversary class C, the adversary observes all
outputs corresponding to the inputs of an honest relay in random
order. Combined with random ID replacement, this prevents
the adversary from linking departing onions to their received
counterparts. However, it can still be observed that a user is
actively sending if she has not previously received an onion
(or: that a user is receiving, if upon receiving an onion she
subsequently does not send one). This leads to Theorem 1,
which we prove in Appendix B2.
Theorem 1: F achieves MOe, SMLs and RML0, and those
implied by them, but no other notions of [25] for C.
Note that under this adversary model sender anonymity
(SML) is achieved even if the receiver is corrupted. From the
hierarchy of [25], we know that this strong version of sender
6However, we include modification attacks that do not lead to dropping or
delaying onions, like classical tagging attacks. A protocol realizing the ideal
functionality might either drop modified onions or keep them in the network,
but prevent the attacker from learning critical information from them (i.e. the
modified onion’s path and message have no correlation to the original one’s).
7This limitation is not significant in practical implementations as they need
to employ additional protection against privacy attacks based on dropping and
delaying onions.
Algorithm 1: Ideal Functionality F
Data structure:
Bad: Set of Corrupted Nodes
L: List of Onions processed by adversarial nodes
Bi: List of Onions held by node Pi
// Notation:
// S: Adversary (resp. Simulator)
// Z: Environment
// P = (Po1 , . . . , Pon ): Onion path
// O = (sid, Ps, Pr,m, n,P, i): Onion = (session ID, sender,
receiver, message, path length, path, traveled
distance)
// N: Maximal onion path length
On message Process_New_Onion(Pr,m, n,P) from Ps
// Ps creates and sends a new onion (either
instructed by Z if honest or S if corrupted)
if |P| > N ; // selected path too long
then
Reject;
else
sid←R session ID ; // pick random session ID
O ← (sid, Ps, Pr,m, n,P, 0) ; // create new onion
Output_Corrupt_Sender(Ps, sid, Pr,m, n,P, start);
Process_Next_Step(O);
Procedure Output_Corrupt_Sender(Ps, sid, Pr,m, n,P, temp)
// Give all information about onion to adversary if
sender is corrupt
if Ps ∈ Bad then
Send “temp belongs to onion from Ps with sid, Pr,m, n,P” to S;
Procedure Process_Next_Step(O = (sid, Ps, Pr,m, n,P, i))
// Router Poi just processed O that is now passed to
router Poi+1
if Poj ∈ Bad for all j > i ; // All remaining nodes
including receiver are corrupt
then
Send “Onion from Poi with message m for Pr routed through
(Poi+1 , . . . , Pon )” to S;
Output_Corrupt_Sender(Ps, sid, Pr,m, n,P, end);
else
// there exists an honest successor Poj
Poj ← Pok with smallest k such that Pok 6∈ Bad
temp←R temporary ID;
Send “Onion temp from Poi routed through (Poi+1 , . . . , Poj−1 )
to Poj ” to S;
Output_Corrupt_Sender(Ps, sid, Pr,m, n,P, temp);
Add (temp,O, j) to L; // see Deliver_Message(temp)
to continue this routing
On message Deliver_Message(temp) from S
// Adversary S (controlling all links) delivers
onion belonging to temp to next node
if (temp, , ) ∈ L then
Retrieve (temp,O = (sid, Ps, Pr,m, n,P, i), j) from L;
O ← (sid, Ps, Pr,m, n,P, j); // jth router reached
if j < n+ 1 then
temp′ ←R temporary ID;
Send “temp′ received” to Poj ;
Store (temp′, O) in Boj ; // See
Forward_Onion(temp′) to continue
else
if m 6=⊥ then
Send “Message m received” to Pr
On message Forward_Onion(temp′) from Pi
// Pi is done processing onion with temp
′ (either
decided by Z if honest or S if corrupted)
if (temp′, ) ∈ Bi then
Retrieve (temp′, O) from Bi;
Remove (temp′, O) from Bi;
Process_Next_Step(O);
anonymity also implies relationship anonymity (SRL). Note
further that the receiver anonymity (RML) is only achieved
if neither the sender nor the receiver is compromised. Thus,
as soon as the sender is corrupted, receiver anonymity is no
longer achieved.
C. First Summary
We have seen that the ideal functionality indeed provides the
privacy expected from OR. Showing that a system realizes the
ideal functionality proves these privacy notions for an adversary
that cannot do timing-based traffic analysis. Even if in practice
stronger adversary models are assumed, proving the realization
of the ideal functionality is a useful way to reduce the problem
of proving privacy to the attacks excluded by our adversary
class C.
IV. FIRST PITFALL: INCOMPLETE PROPERTIES
We first explain a known attack on Sphinx that should not
be possible if Sphinx realizes the ideal functionality. Then
we analyze the properties to see why the insecurity was not
detected in the proof: the properties are incomplete and some
of them do not increase privacy. We further generalize the
attack on Sphinx and introduce an insecure protocol to make
the shortcoming obvious and to help us in the construction
of a new improved property. After that, we present a second
independent insecurity, a corresponding broken protocol and
again construct a new property to protect against it. Finally,
we ensure that no more properties are missing by proving that
they indeed imply the ideal functionality.
A. Attack on Sphinx
In Sphinx as presented in [13] the exit node receives β as
part of the header. β contains the receiver address, an identifier,
and a 0-bit string to pad β for the exit node to a fixed length.
It is again padded with a filler string of random bits that
compensates for the parts used to encrypt the earlier relay
addresses. Further, the three components are XORed with the
output of a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG).
The exit node hence can learn the length of the chosen path8
with the following attack: The adversarial exit node observes
(after XORing) where the first 1 bit after the identifier is.
It knows that the filler string starts there or earlier and can
determine by the length of the filler string a lower bound on
the length of the path used.
Being able to know the length of the path is critical. If e.g.
the routing topology is restricted or large parts of the path
are only adversarial relays, this information limits the number
of users under which the sender can hide and thus reduces
her protection. According to the ideal functionality such an
attack should not be possible if Sphinx, as proven with the
properties of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya, realizes the ideal
functionality.
8To the best of our knowledge this flaw is only mentioned and corrected
in the Sphinx implementation so far: https://github.com/UCL-InfoSec/sphinx/
blob/c05b7034eaffd8f98454e0619b0b1548a9fa0f42/SphinxClient.py#L67
B. Analyzing the Original Properties
In this section we have a closer look at the properties
to see why the attack on Sphinx is not detected and we
make four observations. The original definition of Onion-
Correctness technically was not entirely correct, which we
fix briefly. Integrity and Wrap-Resistance do not add privacy to
the proposed combination of properties, at all. Onion-Security
is required, but fails to protect against some weaknesses.
1) Onion-Correctness: Informally, Onion-Correctness re-
quires that all messages use the intended path and reach the
intended receiver in absence of an adversary:
Definition 1 (Original Onion-Correctness): Let
(G,FormOnion,ProcOnion) be an OR scheme with
maximal path length N . Then for all polynomial numbers of
routers Pi, for all settings of the public parameters p, for all
(PK(P ), SK(P )) generated by G(1λ, p, P ), for all n < N ,
for all messages m ∈M, and for all onions O1 formed as
(O1, . . . , On+1)←FormOnion(m, (P1, . . . , Pn+1),
(PK(P1), . . . , PK(Pn+1)))
the following is true:
1) correct path: P(O1, P1) = (P1, . . . , Pn+1),
2) correct layering: L(O1, P1) = (O1, . . . , On+1),
3) correct decryption:
(m,⊥) = ProcOnion(SK(Pn+1), On+1, Pn+1),
where P(O,P ) returns the path included in O and L(O,P )
the onion layers.
This however cannot be achieved by Sphinx or almost any
other system suggested or implemented so far. They commonly
use duplicate checks, which, practically implemented, may
fail in a small number of cases (for example due to hash
collisions) in reality. We hence allow the requirements 1) - 3)
of the definition to fail with negligible probability, so that real
systems can achieve Onion-Correctness at all.
This leads to the following changes in Definition 1:
Definition 2: (Onion-Correctness)
[as in Definition 1]... the following is true:
1) correct path:
Pr[P(O1, P1) = (P1, . . . , Pn+1)] ≥ 1−negl(λ),
2) correct layering:
Pr[L(O1, P1) = (O1, . . . , On+1)] ≥ 1−negl(λ),
3) correct decryption:
Pr[(m,⊥) = ProcOnion(SK(Pn+1), On+1, Pn+1)]
≥ 1−negl(λ).
2) Wrap-Resistance and Onion-Integrity: Onion-Integrity
limits the number of honest relays that any onion (even one
created by the adversary) can traverse.
Definition 3 (Onion-Integrity i.a.w. [8]): For all probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT) adversaries, the probability (taken over
the choice of the public parameters p, the set of honest router
names Q and the corresponding PKI, generated by G) that an
adversary with adaptive access to ProcOnion(SK(P ), ·, P )
procedures for all P ∈ Q, can produce and send to a router
P1 ∈ Q an onion O1 such that |P(O1, P1)| > N , where
P(O1, P1) is the path the onion takes, is negligible.
Wrap-Resistance informally means that given an onion,
which resulted from processing at a certain relay, the adversary
cannot add a layer to it, such that processing at another relay
results in the same onion.
Definition 4 (Wrap-Resistance i.a.w. [8]): Consider an
adversary interacting with an OR challenger as follows.
1) The adversary receives as input a challenge pub-
lic key PK, chosen by the challenger by letting
(PK,SK)← G(1λ, p, P ), and the router name P .
2) The adversary submits any number of onions Oi of
her choice to the challenger, and obtains the output
of ProcOnion(SK,Oi, P ).
3) The adversary submits n, a message m, a set of router
names (P1, . . . , Pn+1), an index j, and n key pairs
1 ≤ i ≤ n, i 6= j, (PKi, SKi). The challenger checks
that the router names are valid, that the public keys
correspond to the secret keys and if so, sets PKj =
PK, sets bit b at random and does the following:
• If b = 0, let (O1, . . . , Oj , . . . , On+1) ←
FormOnion(m, (P1, . . . , Pn+1), (PK1, . . . , PKn+1))
• Otherwise, let r ←R M, and (O1, . . . , Oj) ←
FormOnion(r, (P1, . . . , Pj), (PK1, . . . , PKj))
The challenger returns O1 to the adversary.
4) The adversary may submit any number of onions
Oi 6= Oj of her choice to the challenger, and obtain
the output of ProcOnion(SK,Oi, P ).
5) The adversary submits a secret key SK ′, an iden-
tity P ′ 6= Pj−1, and an onion O′. If P ′ is
valid and SK ′, O′, P ′ satisfy the condition Oj =
ProcOnion(SK ′, O′, P ′) he wins the game.
An OR scheme satisfies Wrap-Resistance if for all PPT ad-
versaries A the adversary’s probability of winning is negligible.
We realized that (in combination with Onion-Security and
Onion-Correctness) Wrap-Resistance and Onion-Integrity are
not related to any privacy goal in anonymous communication.
To show this, we describe a template for adding Wrap-
Resistance and Onion-Integrity of [8] to any OR protocol
with Onion-Security without reducing the privacy relevant
information an adversary learns and while preserving Onion-
Correctness and Onion-Security.
Recall that Onion-Integrity limits the number of honest hops
an onion can take to N . Our basic idea for achieving Onion-
Integrity is to append N chained MACs to any onion, such
that each router on the path has to verify one of them (for
their current onion layer) and such that modifying or including
more MACs is not possible. Hence, an onion can only traverse
N honest routers, i.e. the protocol has Onion-Integrity. Used
MAC blocks are replaced with deterministic padding similar to
the scheme of [8] to keep the length fixed.9 To achieve Wrap-
Resistance, we assure that the deterministic padding depends
on the identity of the processing router and that a collision for
a different identity only happens with negligible probability.
Thus, wrapping an onion, such that if it is processed with
another router, creates the same deterministic padding is hard,
9A fixed length is necessary to achieve Onion-Security.
i.e. Wrap-Resistance is achieved. The general structure of our
appended extension and some further details that we explain
in the next paragraph can be seen in Fig. 2.
... ...
... ...
Fig. 2. exti (resp. exti+1, that is appended to the original onion layer Oi
(resp. Oi+1). Depicted in blue are the unused MAC blocks, in orange the
deterministic padding. {X}k is short for encryption with key k. ki is the
symmetric key, PKi the public key of Pi. B
j
i s is short for the concatenation
of all blocks that follow in the extension, i.e. j ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}.
a) Protocol Transformation: For our transformation we
require a number of efficient primitives:
• Encasym : KPub ×Masym → Casym: a non-malleable
IND-CCA secure asymmetric encryption function for
which public keys are shared in advance
• Decasym : KPriv × Casym → Masym: decryption
function to Encasym
• MAC : Ksym ×MMAC 7→ T : secure symmetric MAC
scheme; a pseudo-random function (PRF)10
• V er : Ksym × T × MMAC 7→ {0, 1}: verification
algorithm to MAC
• Encsym : Ksym×Casym → Casym with Ksym = {0, 1}λ:
IND-CCA2 secure symmetric encryption function
• Decsym : Ksym × Casym → Casym decryption function
to Encsym
• PRNG : Ksym × N→ Casym: secure PRNG
• embed : Ksym × T →Masym: bijective map
• extract : Masym → Ksym × T : inverse operation
extract = embed−1
• KDF : Ssalt × Ksym 7→ Ksym: collision resistant key
derivation function with salt space Ssalt11
Let Π be an OR protocol that transfers a message m from a
sender P0 to a receiver Pn+1 over n intermediate routers {Pi}
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let n ≤ N . Based on any such protocol Π
we create an extended protocol Πwi using FormOnionwi and
ProcOnionwi that has Wrap-Resistance and Onion-Integrity:
FormOnionwi: The sender uses Algorithm 2 of Ap-
pendix C to construct onion layers. Each layer is the con-
catenation of the original onion layer and our extension. As
explained before, the length of the appended extension exti
has to be constant for fixed N and λ, and thus is a known
system parameter. We treat exti as a concatenated sequence of
N blocks (see Fig. 2), each being an element of the asymmetric
ciphertextspace c ∈ Casym. We split this sequence in the blocks
that contains MAC tags ti and the padding blocks that contain
only decrypted random numbers rdmi to guarantee a constant
length N · |c|, i.e. for all i: |(ti‖rdmi)| = N · |c|.
10This holds for constructions like HMAC using a PRF as compression
function (like SHA3).
11For example HKDF [24], which is based on HMAC, is such a KDF.
First the decrypted random numbers are chosen. We use
pseudo-random numbers that the adversary cannot easily mod-
ify as otherwise Onion-Integrity would be broken12. Algorithm
3 of Appendix C shows how the padded (pseudo-) randomness
at each layer is calculated based on the way the onions will be
processed. Then those values are used to calculate the MAC
blocks ti as they also protect the chosen pseudo-randomness
from modifications. Each such block Bi of ti is encrypted with
the corresponding router’s public key and carries an ephemeral
symmetric key ki and a MAC tag ti that authenticates the other
N −1 received blocks, as well as the next onion layer Oi+1 as
formed by FormOnion. As the adversary should not be able
to break Onion-Security due to our adaption, we use layered
encryption on each block to assure that extensions cannot be
linked. Algorithm 4 of Appendix C contains the details.
ProcOnionwi: The processing at each router is shown in
Algorithm 5 of Appendix C for the overview and Algorithm 6 of
Appendix C for the processing of the added extension. Basically,
the added extension is split from the onion layer of the original
protocol, which is processed as before. The extension is checked
for the length and processing is aborted if the extension has
an incorrect length. Otherwise, the first block of the extension
is decrypted with the asymmetric secret key of the node and
removed from the extension. The included ephemeral key ki
is retrieved and the included tag is verified. If the validation
fails, the onion is discarded. Otherwise, after decryption of the
other blocks, a new block ri is appended to the extension
by generating a pseudo-random number based on ki and
the router’s own identity Pi as ri ← PRNG(KDF (Pi, ki)).
Notice, that we include the routers identity in the calculation
of the pseudo-random padding to guarantee Wrap-Resistance.
Our described transformation supports any maximum path
length N <∞. In our protocol Πwi, the maximum path length
N can thus be chosen to be any value supported by the protocol
Π.
b) Analysis: We show that the extended protocol achieves
Wrap-Resistance and Onion-Integrity, that Onion-Security and
-Correctness are preserved, and that an adversary learns not
less information about the communications as for the original
protocol Π if Π has Onion-Security.
Theorem 2: The extended protocol Πwi has Wrap-Resistance
as defined in Definition 4.
We prove this theorem by contradiction. We assume that we
can break Wrap-Resistance given the extended protocol and
reduce it to finding a collision for the collision resistant KDF
(thus breaking the KDF).
Proof: Assume that the extended protocol Πwi does not
achieve Wrap-Resistance as given by Definition 4. As the adver-
sary can break Wrap-Resistance, there exists an identity P ′ 6=
Pj−1 for which she can for a given onion Oj efficiently gener-
ate SK ′, O′ such that (P ′′, Oj) = ProcOnionwi(SK ′, O′, P ′).
Therefore, the processing of ext′ must result in extj , which
is the extension part of Oj . In particular, the newly at-
tached randomness r′i has to match the one of extj , i.e.
12An adversarial router could extend the path by picking a correct MAC
for an honest router as its random number.
PRNG(KDF (kj−1, Pj−1)) = PRNG(KDF (k′, P ′)) for
the adversarial chosen k′, P ′. This can happen if there is a
collision in the PRNG output. Let the length of the PRNG
output be lprng = |c|, c ∈ Casym. We have lprng > λ
due to generating elements from the space of asymmetric
ciphertexts. As we assume a cryptographically secure PRNG
constructed from a collision-resistant hash function (PRF), or
a secure block cipher (PRP), the probability to output the
same random sequence for two different inputs is negligible
(PRF) or impossible (PRP). The adversary must therefore have
generated the same input to PRNG, which means that she can
efficiently generate an input key k′ and identity P ′ 6= Pj−1 for
KDF , such that KDF (kj−1, Pj−1) = KDF (k′, P ′), thus
create a collision on KDF. Finding a collision in KDF (·, ·)
however happens only with negligible probability [23] due to
our assumption of a secure KDF. With this contradiction it
follows that no adversary can break Wrap-Resistance for Πwi
.
Theorem 3: The extended protocol Πwi has Onion-Integrity
as defined in Definition 3.
We prove this theorem by contradiction. Keep in mind that
for the Onion-Integrity game, the adversary has adaptive access
to the ProcOnionwi(SK, ·, P ) oracle for any router identity P
while creating the onion and that she is not allowed to modify
an onion while it is being processed. Otherwise, it would be
trivial to build an onion that traverses more than N honest
routers by forming two onions and replacing the first after N
hops.
Proof: Assume that an adversary can form an onion that
traverses more than N honest routers. Recall that the extension
exti appended to each onion Oi formed by FormOnion in Πwi
is a sequence of N blocks of fixed length (otherwise processing
is aborted). Thus, the malicious sender cannot use more than
N blocks as extension to an onion Oi. Further, the adversary
for Onion-Integrity is not allowed to modify the onion. Hence,
an onion that reaches router N + 1 will find as first block
BN+1 the pseudo-random number generated by the first router
using PRNG(KDF (P1, k1)), decrypted by all the ephemeral
keys ki, 2 ≤ i ≤ N . This multiple times decrypted pseudo-
random number is interpreted as a key kN+1 and tag tN+1.
For successful processing at node N + 1 the found tag tN+1
must validate the other blocks, as well as the next onion ON+2
under key kN+1. The adversary must thus choose k1 and P1
such that Dec2≤i≤Nsym (ki, PRNG(KDF (P1, k1))) yields such
a valid tag. This is a collision on the tags, which contradicts
the assumption of the use of a pseudo-random function within
the MAC system.
Theorem 4: The extended protocol Πwi has Onion-
Correctness of [8]13 if the underlying OR protocol Π has
Onion-Correctness.
Proof: Property (1), correct path, follows from the fact that
the same routing algorithms FormOnion and ProcOnion are
used in both protocols. Routing may additionally abort in
13The Onion-Correctness property of [8] requires a probability of 1, which
cannot be fulfilled in negligibly many cases if Onion-Correctness depends on
computationally secure algorithms.
ProcOnionwi if the received tag ti is invalid for the received
appended blocks and processed Oi+1. However, as a honest
sender correctly runs the FormOnionwi protocol, it will create
valid tags and routing will not abort. Property (2), correct
layering, follows for the original onion Oi from the use of the
same algorithms ProcOnion and FormOnion in both protocols.
Correct processing of the extension follows by inspection from
the use of the correct processing algorithm in the creation of
the blocks in FormOnionwi. Property (3), correct decryption,
follows from the fact that at the same time ProcOnion returns
(⊥,m), also ProcOnionwi returns (⊥,m).
Theorem 5: The extended protocol Πwi has Onion-Security
of [8] if the underlying OR protocol Π has Onion-Security.
Proof: Assume there exists an adversary that can break
Onion-Security of Πwi. The proof is split into two parts: non-
modifying adversary and modifying adversary. From the Onion-
Security of Π we know that nothing about the input in the
onion except the first part of the path until the honest relay can
be learned from the original onion layers and that the original
onion layers cannot be modified to learn something about the
remaining path or message from oracle queries.
We start with the non-modifying adversary and split onions
into two parts: An original onion part O, as generated by Π
an the extension ext as appended in Πwi.
The original protocol Π has Onion-Security. Thus, the
adversary cannot learn enough information from the original
onion part to break Onion-Security, as this implies an attack
on Onion-Security in Π. As the adversary did not use the
original onion part he must have used the extension to break
Onion-Security.
The extension ext is a sequence of N blocks. Assume the
adversary gains enough information to break Onion-Security
from the last N − 1 blocks. As these blocks are asymmet-
rically encrypted using the public key of following nodes,
learning something about the input of FormOnionwi from
these blocks implies learning something about the plaintext of
the asymmetrically encrypted values. The adversary can thus
break the security of the asymmetric encryption scheme, which
contradicts our assumption of a secure asymmetric encryption
scheme.
The length of the extension is fixed, therefore, she must
have learned something from the first block of ext. This
block contains an independent randomly chosen ephemeral key
(which carries no information) and a tag over the processed
original onion Oi+1 (using ProcOnion from Π) and the
remaining encrypted blocks. Everything authenticated by the
tag is known to the adversarial router, and as such the tag does
not include any new information, thus no relevant information
to distinguish challenge bit b can be extracted from it. Hence,
an adversary cannot gain an advantage based on the extension
compared to Π.
Modifying adversary: The adversary must therefore have
gained sufficient information from modifying the challenge
onion and the use of oracles. In Πwi, similar to Π, an onion
generated by running FormOnionwi does not depend on the
input of previous FormOnionwi calls. Thus, using the first
oracle in Onion-Security before deciding on the challenge
input does not help.
Using the second oracle, after deciding on challenge input,
with a newly generated onion using FormOnionwi does not
help deciding b due to the same reason as for the first
oracle above. The adversary must have gained an advantage
by modifying Oi‖ext. Any modification to Oi or ext will
invalidate the tag contained in ext except with negligible
probability. Thus, she must be able to construct a valid tag
as otherwise the next honest node stops processing when
verification fails. Constructing a valid tag without knowing the
input or key, both of which is encrypted using the public key of
the honest node or the encapsulated ephemeral symmetric key,
breaks the security of the MAC algorithm. This contradicts the
assumption of a secure MAC.
Hence, she can only construct a valid tag by knowing the
input to the secure MAC signing algorithm. However, one
part of the input is the original processed onion layer Oj+1,
which is generated by the honest router using its private key.
If she learns this layer, she is able to break Onion-Security
of Π (by picking Pj as receiver and comparing Oj+1 with
the chosen message). As this contradicts the precondition, it
follows that the adversary is not able to construct a valid tag
(unless with negligible probability) and thus cannot construct
a valid extension ext for a modified packet.
Any adversary learns not less relevant information:
We consider only information about the communications
relevant for privacy. As the adversary model of the ideal
functionality excludes timing attacks, we ignore the timing
dimension. This results in the sender, message and receiver
and their combinations being the relevant information of a
communication. Further, we need the following assumption:
Assumption 4: Any output of FormOnion contains at most
negligible information about the inputs of other FormOnion
calls.
Theorem 6: If the underlying protocol Π has Onion-Security,
the extended protocol Πwi leaks not less information about the
communications to an adversary A than Π.
Proof: We split the proof in (1) passive observation and (2)
active modifications. Assume the same input to FormOnion
and FormOnionwi. (1) Then Πwi uses the same path as
Π because its routing decisions are not influenced by the
extension. As the extensions added in Πwi have a constant
length that depends on publicly known system parameters only,
the adversary can remove the extensions and retrieve the exact
same onion layers as would be sent in Π. So, at each router
and each link the information that is available in Π is also
available in Πwi14.
(2) Dropping and inserting valid onions as sender is possible
as before. However, modifications or insertion of onions
that deviate from outputs of FormOnion might be dropped
at an honest node because of the added validity check for
the tag. Assume the adversary can do such modifications to
14Notice that the passive observation is even independent of Π having
Onion-Security and Assumption 4.
learn more information about communications in Π. Gaining
such advantage from modifications implies that the adversary
receives output from an honest node processing the modified
onion. This output must be related to an onion from an
honest sender (as otherwise the adversary already knows all
about the communication beforehand). The onion about whose
communication the adversary learns is either (2a) the onion
that was modified or (2b) another onion from an honest sender.
(2a) As the output of the honest node is an onion layer, the
adversary can solely learn about the inputs to FormOnion from
it or link it to the ingoing modified onion. The latter just helps
to gain new information about the communication if (some
part) of the path or message stays the same and is learned.
The inputs to FormOnion are the path, which is only new
information (compared to passive attacks) for the adversary
after the honest node, and the message. Thus, the adversary
learns in any case something about the message or the path
after the honest node.
Then she can construct an attack on Onion-Security based
on this: She uses the same modifications to learn about the
challenge onion. The oracles are used to query outputs of
an honest node regarding a modified (inserted) onion. This
allows inference of information about the output of an honest
node processing the challenge onion. She thus learns about
the message, or path after the honest node, i.e. she has an
advantage in distinguishing the challenge bit, which contradicts
that Πwi has Onion-Security. But Πwi has because Π has and
the extension preserves Onion-Security.
(2b) As onion layers carry merely negligible information
about other onions (Assumption 4), the modification cannot
be used to learn about the inputs of the original onion directly.
Instead, it can only be used to recognize this onion after the
processing of the honest node and exclude it from the candidate
onion layers that might belong to the original onion. However,
this exclusion can also be achieved by creating and sending
a new onion, which the adversary recognizes after the honest
node because she knows all onion layers for her own onions.
Hence, this attack can be translated to another attack without
modifications that is thus also possible in the extended protocol.
3) Onion-Security: Onion-Security states that an adversary
on the path between an honest sender and the next honest node
(relay or receiver) cannot distinguish an onion that was created
with her inputs (except for the keys of the honest node) from
another one that contains a different message and is destined
for this next honest node.
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Fig. 3. Onion-Security game illustrated: Circled numbers represent the steps,
and the boxes the parties of the game.
a) Game Structure: We illustrate the Onion-Security
game in Fig. 3 and explain the steps informally first:
Basic Game (Step 1, 3 - 6, 8): Apart from an honest
sender, Onion-Security assumes the existence of only a single
honest relay (Pj). First in Step 1, the challenger chooses the
name and public key of the honest node and sends it to the
adversary. In the challenge starting in Step 3, the adversary
is allowed to pick any combination of message and path as
input choice of the honest sender, to model the worst case. In
Step 4-6 the challenger checks that the choice is valid and if
so, creates two onions O1, O¯1 and sends one of them to the
adversary depending on the challenge bit b. Finally in Step 8,
the adversary makes a guess b′ on which onion she received.
Adaptive and Modification Attacks (Step 2 and 7): So
far the adversary only focused on one onion. However, a real
adversary can act adaptively and observe and send modified
onions to the honest node that she wants to bypass before and
after the actual attack. Therefore, Onion-Security includes two
oracle steps. To decide on her input and guess, the adversary
is allowed to insert onions (other than the challenge onion) to
the honest relay and observe the processed output as an oracle
(Steps 2 and 7).
How the two onions O1, O¯1 differ is illustrated in Fig. 4. O1
is the first layer of the onion formed with the adversary chosen
inputs, where the honest relay is at position j. In contrast, O¯1
is the first layer of the onion formed with the same path as O1
except that the path ends at Pj as the receiver and a random
message. The adversary can calculate the onion layers up to
the honest relay based on the first layer. Onion-Security is
achieved if the adversary is unable to distinguish whether the
observed onion contains her chosen inputs or random content
destined for the honest relay.
......
b=0
b=1
...
Fig. 4. Cases of Onion-Security illustrated: Red boxes represented corrupted
relays, black boxes honest. The upper row of arrows represents the path of
the onion O with inputs chosen by the adversary (message m received by
Pn+1); the lower an onion O¯ containing a randomly chosen message m′ that
takes the path to the honest relay Pj , only. For b = 0 the onion layers in
the orange ellipse are observed by the adversary, i.e. the layers processed at
P1..Pj−1 of onion O. For b = 1 the layers in the blue ellipse are observed,
i.e. the corresponding layers of O¯. Notice that the adversary does not observe
any output of Pj in this game.
b) Definition: Formally, the Onion-Security game is
defined as follows:
Definition 5 (Original Onion-Security): Consider an adver-
sary interacting with an OR challenger as follows.
1) The adversary receives as input a challenge public
key PK, chosen by the challenger who generates
(PK,SK)← G(1λ, p, Pj), and the router name Pj .
2) The adversary submits any number of onions Oi of her
choice to the challenger (oracle queries), and obtains
the output of ProcOnion(SK,Oi, Pj).
3) The adversary submits n, a message m, a set of router
names (P1, . . . , Pn+1), an index j, and n key pairs
1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1, i 6= j, (PKi, SKi).
4) The challenger checks that the router names are valid,
that the public keys correspond to the secret keys and
if so, sets PKj = PK and sets bit b at random.
5) If the adversary input was valid, the challenger picks
m′ ←RM randomly and calculates:
(O1, . . . , Oj , . . . , On+1)←
FormOnion(m, (P1, . . . , Pn+1), (PK1, . . . , PKn+1))
(O¯1, . . . , O¯j)←
FormOnion(m′, (P1, . . . , Pj), (PK1, . . . , PKj))
6) • If b = 0, the challenger returns O1 to the adversary.
• Otherwise, the challenger returns O¯1 to the adver-
sary.
7) The adversary may again query the oracle and submit
any number of onions Oi 6= Oj , Oi 6= O¯j of her
choice to the challenger, to obtain the output of
ProcOnion(SK,Oi, Pj).
8) The adversary then produces a guess b′.
Onion-Security is achieved if any PPT adversary A, cannot
guess b′ = b with a probability non-negligibly better than 12 .
Onion-Security hence aims at guaranteeing that an adversary
observing an onion before it is processed by an honest relay
cannot discover information about the message it contains,
or the path it subsequently takes. As the adversary controls
all links, she could link message and receiver to the sender,
otherwise. Further, step 7 provides protection against active
modification attacks, as it allows processing of any modified
onion.
The property however does not consider a malicious receiver
or exit node, which hence might be able to discover information
about the path or sender. Notice that this is exactly what
happens in the attack on Sphinx; a malicious exit node learns
information (the length) of the path.
C. Security against Malicous Receivers
In this subsection, we show the first shortcoming, missing
protection against a malicious receiver, by giving a simplified
broken protocol that allows the receiver to learn the complete
path and yet achieves all suggested properties. Based on this
discovery we introduce an improved property.
1) Insecurity: Signaling the Path: We first generalize the
attack on Sphinx from Section IV-A, which only leaked the
path length. As generalization we give a protocol that complies
to the properties, but includes the complete path (including the
sender) in the message. Thus, an adversarial receiver learns
the complete path the onion took.
This weakness differs from the common assumption that
one cannot protect senders that reveal their identity in their
self-chosen message: independent of the message the sender
chooses, the protocol always adds the complete sender-chosen
path to it. Thus, an adversarial receiver always learns the sender
and all relays independent of the sender’s choice. Clearly, such
an OR scheme should not be considered secure and private
and hence should not achieve the OR properties.
a) Insecure Protocol 1: The main idea of this counterex-
ample is to use a secure OR scheme and adapt it such that the
path is part of the sent message.
We illustrate this idea in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. Illustration of the message extension used as message in Π
More formally, our extended protocol Πbroken1 using
FormOnionbroken1 and ProcOnionbroken1 is created from
the “secure” onion routing protocol Π from [8]. Π transfers
a message m from a sender P0 to a receiver Pn+1 over n
intermediate routers {Pi} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n using FormOnionΠ
and ProcOnionΠ.
Sender [FormOnionbroken1]: The sender P0 wants to
send message m ∈ {0, 1}lm−lP over path P , where lm
is the length of messages in Π and lP is the maximal
length of the encoding of any valid path including the sender.
FormOnionbroken1 creates a new message m′ = m‖e(P0‖P),
where e encodes the path and is padded to length lP .
FormOnionbroken1 runs the original algorithm FormOnionΠ
with the inputs chosen by the sender except that the message
is replaced with m′.
Intermediate Router [ProcOnionbroken1]: Any interme-
diate runs ProcOnionΠ on Oi to create Oi+1 and sends it to
the next router.
Receiver [ProcOnionbroken1]: The receiver getting On+1
executes ProcOnionΠ on it to retrieve m′. It learns the path
from the last lP bits and outputs the first lm − lP bits as the
received message.
b) Analysis regarding properties: The properties follow
from the corresponding properties of the original protocol. As
we only add and remove e(P0‖P) to and from the message,
the same path is taken and the complete onion layers Oi are
calculated as before. Hence, Correctness and Onion-Integrity
hold, and re-wrapping them is as difficult as before. Only Onion-
Security remains. As Π has Onion-Security, the adversary
cannot learn enough about the message included in the first
onion layers to distinguish it from a random message. Thus,
she especially cannot distinguish the last lP bits from random
ones in Π. As in Onion-Security the adversary learns nothing
else, the adversary in Πbroken1 cannot distinguish our adapted
message bits from random ones. Thus, adapting does not
introduce any advantage in breaking Onion-Security.
2) Improved Property: Tail-Indistinguishability TI against
a corrupted receiver : We construct the new property Tail-
Indistinguishability TI to deal with malicious receivers. There-
fore, the adversary has to get access to the onion layers after
the last honest relay has processed them because a malicious
receiver learns those. Our property challenges the adversary
behind the last honest relay to distinguish between the onion
generated with her original inputs, and a second onion that
carries the identical message and follows the identical path
behind the honest relay but otherwise was constructed with
randomly chosen input, i.e. the path before the honest node is
chosen randomly.
Note that this new property indeed prevents the insecurity
given in Section IV-C1 and the attack on Sphinx: If the receiver
is able to reconstruct any information of the path before the
honest node, the adversary can compare this information with
her input choice. In case the information does not match her
choice, she knows that it must have been the second onion
and thus is able to distinguish the onions.
......
b=0
b=1
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Fig. 6. Cases of TI illustrated: Red boxes are adversarial routers; black boxes
honest and curvy arrows symbolize a random path possibly through many
other adversarial routers. In case b = 0 the adversary chosen onion is observed
at the end of the path (orange ellipse). For b = 1 onion layers that take the
same path between Pj and Pn+1 and include the same message (the blue
ellipse), but differ otherwise, are observed instead. Earlier layers (before Pj )
are in both cases not given to the adversary.
Intuitively, the steps are the same as in Onion-Security
described in Section IV-B3a, except that we change the answer
to the challenge. This time we protect the last part of the
path and output those layers. Since the receiver is corrupted,
the message is learned by the adversary anyways and hence
we use the same message for the alternative layers (b = 1).
We illustrate the new outputs to the adversary in Fig. 6 and
formally define the new property in our Definition 6.
Thus, our first new property TI is defined as:
Definition 6 (Tail-Indistinguishability TI):
1) The adversary receives as input the challenge pub-
lic key PK, chosen by the challenger by letting
(PK,SK)← G(1λ, p, Pj), and the router name Pj .
2) The adversary may submit any number of onions Oi of
her choice to the challenger. The challenger sends the
output of ProcOnion(SK,Oi, Pj) to the adversary.
3) The adversary submits a message m, a path P =
(P1, . . . , Pj , . . . , Pn+1) with the honest node at posi-
tion j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n+ 1 of her choice and key pairs for
all nodes (PKi, SKi) (1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1 for the nodes
on the path and n+ 1 < i for the other relays).
4) The challenger checks that the router names are valid,
that the public keys correspond to the secret keys and
that the same key pair is chosen if the router names
are equal, and if so, sets PKj = PK and sets bit b
at random.
5) The challenger creates the onion with the adversary’s
input choice:
(O1, . . . , On+1)← FormOnion(m,P, (PK)P)
and a random onion with a randomly chosen path P¯ =
(P¯1, . . . , P¯k = Pj , . . . , P¯n¯+1 = Pn+1), that includes
the subpath from the honest relay to the corrupted
receiver starting at position k ending at n¯+ 1:
(O¯1, . . . , O¯n¯+1)← FormOnion(m, P¯, (PK)P¯)
6) • If b = 0, the challenger gives (Oj+1, Pj+1) to the
adversary
• Otherwise, the challenger gives (O¯k+1, P¯k+1) to
the adversary
7) The adversary may submit any number of onions Oi of
her choice to the challenger. The challenger sends the
output of ProcOnion(SK,Oi, Pj) to the adversary.
8) The adversary produces guess b′ .
TI is achieved if any PPT adversary A, cannot guess b′ = b
with a probability non-negligibly better than 12 .
D. Linking Protection
The flaw of the previous section is not the only one the
proposed properties missed. Here, we introduce a second
insecure protocol, which allows to bypass honest nodes by
linking onions, and construct a new property against this
weakness.
1) Insecurity: Including Unique Identifiers: The main idea
for this scheme is to take the secure onion routing scheme of [8]
and append the same identifier ID and another extension to all
onion layers of an onion. Our new onion layer is Oi‖ID‖exti,
where Oi denotes the onion layer of the original protocol
and ‖ denotes concatenation. The ID makes the onion easily
traceable, as it stays the same while processing the onion at
a relay. To assure that the properties are still achieved, the
additional extension exti has special characteristics, like to
prohibit modification. In this subsection, we first explain how
exti is built and processed. Then we describe and analyze the
scheme based on exti’s characteristics.
a) Extension: As mentioned, to achieve the properties
although we attach an ID, we need an extension to protect
the ID from modification. More precisely, the extension
needs to fulfill the following characteristics: It cannot leak
information about the inputs to FormOnion as otherwise Onion-
Security breaks. Further, we need to prohibit modification of the
appended ID and extension as otherwise the oracle in Onion-
Security can be used with a modified ID or extension to learn
the next hop and break Onion-Security. Third, we require the
extension to be of fixed length to easily determine where it
starts. Thus, we need an extension exti with the following
characteristics to be created by the sender that knows all Oi’s
(created by a protocol with Onion-Security) and picks ID
randomly:
1) exti does not leak more information about the onion
that it is attached to than the onion already leaks.
2) Except with negligible probability any change of
ID‖exti is detected in ProcOnion of Pi and the
processing aborted.
3) exti has a known fixed length.
... ...
... ...
Fig. 7. exti (resp. exti+1). The current MAC block Bi used by Pi is depicted
in light blue. Dark blue blocks are MAC blocks for upcoming routers, orange
blocks depict the deterministic padding. {X}k is used to denote asymmetric
encryption under key k. PKi is the public key of Pi. B
j
i is short for all
concatenated blocks that follow in the extension, i.e. j ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}.
Extension Description: The basic idea of our extension
is to add one MAC for every router to protect ID‖exti from
modification. Further, similar to the scheme of [8] we use
deterministic padding to ensure exti has a fixed length.
To build this extension, we require a number of primitives:
• Encasym : KPub ×Masym → Casym: a non-malleable
IND-CCA secure asymmetric encryption function for
which public keys are shared in advance
• Decasym : KPriv × Casym → Masym: decryption
function to Encasym
• MAC : Ksym ×MMAC 7→ T : secure symmetric MAC
scheme; modelled as a PRF15
• V er : Ksym × T × MMAC 7→ {0, 1}: verification
algorithm to MAC
• PRNG : Ksym × N→ Casym: secure PRNG
• embed : Ksym × T →Masym: bijective map
• extract : Masym → Ksym × T : inverse operation
extract = embed−1
Recall, that we do assume that a public key infrastructure
(PKI) is in place and that the maximum path length is N .
Forming Extensions: We treat exti as a concatenated vector
of N blocks (see Fig. 7), each being an element of the
asymmetric ciphertextspace c ∈ Casym. We split this vector in
the blocks that contain MACs tagi and the padding blocks that
contain only random numbers rdmi to guarantee a constant
length N · |c|, i.e. for all i: |(tagi‖rdmi)| = N · |c|.
First the random numbers are chosen. The last block is
a pseudo-random number chosen by the previous relay (or
the sender if no previous relay exists and the path is shorter
than N ). The other blocks of rdmi are the result of the same
choice at earlier nodes. We use pseudo-random numbers to
be able to calculate them in advance at the sender. Then the
MAC blocks tagi are calculated. Each such block Bi of tagi
is encrypted with the corresponding router’s public key and
has an ephemeral symmetric key ki and a MAC ti embedded.
The MAC ti authenticates the other N − 1 received blocks of
exti, as well as the chosen ID and next onion layer Oi+1.
Processing Extensions: The extension is checked for the
length and processing is aborted if the extension length does
not match N · |c| . Otherwise, the first block of the extension is
15This holds for constructions like HMAC using a PRF as compression
function (like SHA256).
removed, decrypted with the secret key, the included ephemeral
key ki is extracted and the included MAC is verified. If the
validation fails, the onion is discarded. Otherwise, a new block
ri is added by generating a pseudo-random number based on
ki.
Analysis for Characteristics: As the extension only
consists of encrypted MACs and pseudo-random numbers
it does not leak more information about the onion than the
adversary had before (characteristic 1). If ID‖exti is changed,
it might be modified or completely replaced. If it is modified
either the MAC itself or the input to the MAC is modified.
Thus, except with negligible probability the verification of the
MAC fails and the onion is discarded. To replace it completely
the adversary would need to know the next onion layer after the
honest node Oi+1, which she cannot as the original scheme
has Onion-Security. Thus, a changed ID‖exti is discarded
(characteristic 2). The attached padding blocks assure a fixed
length of N · |c| (characteristic 3).
b) Scheme Description: With the above extension,
we can now create the extended protocol Πbroken using
FormOnionbroken and ProcOnionbroken from Π:
Let Π be the onion routing protocol from [8] that transfers
a message m from a sender P0 to a receiver Pn+1 over n
intermediate routers {Pi} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n using FormOnionΠ
and ProcOnionΠ. Let Oi be the i-th onion layer of an onion
of Π. In our new scheme the i-th onion layer is Oi‖ID‖exti.
Sender [FormOnionbroken]: The sender runs the original
algorithm FormOnionΠ. Additionally, as part of the new
FormOnionbroken a random number ID of fixed length is
picked. The sender creates an extension exti for all layers
i and appends the ID and extension to the onion layers to
generate the output of FormOnionbroken. The resulting onion
layer O′1 = O1‖ID‖ext1 is sent to P1.
Intermediate Router [ProcOnionbroken]: Any interme-
diate router receiving O′i = Oi‖ID‖exti uses the fixed
length of ID and exti (characteristic 3) to split the parts
of the onion layer. This way it retrieves the original onion
layer Oi. Then it runs ProcOnionΠ on Oi to create Oi+1.
Afterwards it processes exti (aborts if the extension was
modified before) to generate exti+1. Finally, it sends the layer
O′i+1 = Oi+1‖ID‖exti+1 to Pi+1.
Receiver[Identical to first part of ProcOnionbroken]: The
receiver getting O′n+1 = On+1‖ID‖extn+1 splits the parts of
the onion layer. Thereby it retrieves the original layer On+1
and executes ProcOnionΠ on it.
c) Analysis regarding properties: The properties follow
from the corresponding properties of the original protocol. As
we only add and remove ID‖ext, the same path is taken
and the onion layers Oi are calculated as before. Hence,
Correctness and Integrity hold. The first part of the onion
is not changed in our modification of the protocol and hence,
re-wrapping this part is as difficult as before. Only Onion-
Security remains. As Π has Onion-Security, it can only be
broken in Πbroken by learning information from ID‖ext (with
or without modification). The ID is chosen randomly and
independent from FormOnion’s input and security parameters.
Hence, it does not depend on any information the adversary
has to distinguish in the Onion-Security game, i.e. the path
and message. By characteristic 1 the extension exti is not
leaking more information than Oi was leaking before, which
is not enough to win the Onion-Security game as Π has
Onion-Security. Only learning by modifying remains. As any
modification of ID‖ext is detected (characteristic 2), the
adversary cannot create an onion layer with modified ID‖ext
that would be processed by the oracle. Hence, adding the
extension does not introduce any advantage in breaking Onion-
Security.
d) Practical Insecurity: ID is never changed and hence
the onion layers can be linked based on it. If the adversary
observes the link from the sender and corrupts the receiver, the
message and sender can be linked. If the adversary observes
the link from the sender and the link to the receiver, the sender
and receiver can be linked. Instead of observing the link, it is
also sufficient to observe as the relay connected to this link16.
In this case, the relay learns the ID as part of the onion and
hence additional hop-to-hop encryption is not sufficient from
a practical standpoint either.
2) Improved Property: Layer-Unlinkability LU against
bypassing honest nodes: To explicitly model that output onions
shall not be linkable to the corresponding inputs of the relays,
the adversary has to get onion layers both before and after
they are processed at the honest relay. Our property challenges
the adversary observing an onion going from the sender to
an honest relay, to distinguish between the onion generated
with her original inputs O, and a second onion O¯. The path
of the alternative onion O¯ includes the original path from the
sender to the honest node, but all other parameters are chosen
randomly. Thus, there might be a path before the sender node
and both the path after the honest node and the message can
differ. Additionally, the adversary always observes the onion
generated by processing O at the honest relay. We illustrate
the new challenge outputs in Fig. 8.
Note that this new property indeed prevents the insecurity
given in Section IV-D1: If the adversary can decide that the
provided onions belong together, she knows that the original
onion has been sent and thus she is able to distinguish the
onions.
We again adapt the original Onion-Security explained in
Section IV-B3a with the difference that the adversary now gets
the layers of O after the honest relay and either O’s layers
between the honest sender and relay or O¯’s layers in Step 6.
This is our new property LU , which is formally defined in
Def. 7.
Definition 7 (Layer-Unlinkability LU ):
1) – 4) as in Def. 6
5) The challenger creates the onion with the adversary’s
input choice:
(O1, . . . , On+1)← FormOnion(m,P, (PK)P)
16We assume the sender is not spoofing its address.
b=0
b=1
b=0
b=1
.........
Fig. 8. Cases of LU illustrated: Red boxes are corrupted routers, black honest
routers and curved arrows represent randomly chosen paths. In case b = 0
the adversary chosen onion, sent from P0, is observed on the complete path
P starting from when it arrives at the first relay P1. For b = 1 the onion
layers in the first orange ellipse are replaced with those of a randomly drawn
onion, that take the same path between P0 and Pj (the blue ellipse), but differ
otherwise and might have traveled from another honest sender to P0 earlier.
and a random onion with a randomly chosen
path P¯ = (P¯1, . . . , P¯k = P1, . . . , P¯k+j =
Pj , P¯k+j+1, . . . , P¯n¯+1), that includes the subpath
from the honest sender to honest node of P starting at
position k ending at k+ j (with 1 ≤ j+k ≤ n¯+ 1 ≤
N ), and a random message m′ ∈M:
(O¯1, . . . , O¯n¯+1)← FormOnion(m′, P¯, (PK)P¯)
6) • If b = 0, the challenger gives
(O1,ProcOnion(Oj)) to the adversary.
• Otherwise, the challenger gives
(O¯k,ProcOnion(Oj)) to the adversary.
7) The adversary may submit any number of onions
Oi, Oi 6= Oj , Oi 6= O¯k+j of her choice to
the challenger. The challenger sends the output of
ProcOnion(SK,Oi, Pj) to the adversary.
8) The adversary produces guess b′ .
LU is achieved if any PPT adversary A, cannot guess b′ = b
with a probability non-negligibly better than 12 .
E. Improved Properties imply Ideal Functionality
In this section we first informally argue and then formally
prove that our two new properties, together with Onion-
Correctness, are sufficient for the ideal functionality. For easier
discussion, we summarize the different outputs of the security
properties in Fig. 9.
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Fig. 9. Difference in security properties illustrated: While in original Onion-
Security no processed onion after Pj is output, LU outputs the processing
and TI challenges to distinguish it from randomness.
Informally: In case of sender corruption, the ideal func-
tionality outputs all information given as input to FormOnion,
and hence we do not need to provide any protection in this
case.
Considering honest senders, the ideal functionality outputs
only the path sections introduced by cutting at honest nodes
together with random onion IDs or if the receiver is compro-
mised, additionally the message. These IDs are independently
drawn for each such section and thus cannot be linked.
The idea to show the same privacy for communications
with honest senders is simple: for every path section instead
of the original onion layers we give the adversary without
her noticing it layers of a random replacement onion. The
replacement onion only corresponds with the original onion
in characteristics she also learns about the onion in the ideal
functionality. Namely those characteristics are the path sections
and if the receiver is corrupted, the message. The replacements
can obviously not be linked or leak any other information as
all their (other) parameters have been chosen randomly.
Our properties are sufficient to show that the adversary
cannot notice the replacement: LU allows to replace any onion
layers on a path section between two honest nodes with onion
layers that are (except for the fact that they use the same path
section) chosen completely at random. The adversary is not able
to notice the replacement as she cannot distinguish the onion
layers in the LU game. This allows us to replace all layers
in communications between honest senders and receivers, and
all except the last section in communications between honest
senders and corrupted receivers.
For replacement on the last part of a path with a corrupted
receiver we need our other property TI . TI allows to replace
any onion layers on a path section between an honest node
and a corrupted receiver with onion layers that are (except for
the fact that they use the same path section and carry the same
message) chosen completely random. The adversary is not able
to notice the replacement as she cannot distinguish the onion
layers in the TI game. This completes our informal argument.
Formally: Similar to Camenisch and Lysyanskaya we
assume a secure protocol to distribute public keys. We consider
key distribution outside of the scope of this paper.
We now show that our new security properties are indeed
sufficient to realize the ideal functionality. Therefore, we define
a secure OR scheme to fulfill all our properties:
Definition 8: A secure OR scheme is a triple of polynomial-
time algorithms (G,FormOnion, ProcOnion) as described
in Section II-E2 that achieves Onion-Correctness (Definition 1),
Tail-Indistinguishability (Definition 6), as well as Layer-
Unlinkability (Definition 7).
Following Camenisch and Lysyanskaya, we build a protocol
from any secure OR scheme by using another ideal functionality
for the distribution of the public keys. Let therefore FRKR be
an ideal functionality that allows to register the public keys.
Definition 9: OR protocol Π is a secure OR protocol (in the
FRKR-hybrid model), iff it is based on a secure OR scheme
(G,FormOnion,ProcOnion) and works as follows:
Setup: Each node Pi generates a key pair (SKi, PKi) ←
G(1Λ) and publishes PKi by using FRKR.
Sending a Message: If PS wants to send m ∈M to Pr over
path P1, . . . , Pn with n < N , he calculates (O1, . . . , On+1)←
FormOnion(m, (P1, . . . , Pn, Pr), (PK1, . . . , PKn, PKr))
and sends O1 to P1.
Processing an Onion: Pi received Oi and runs (Oj , Pj)←
ProcOnion(SKi, Oi, Pi). If Pj =⊥, Pi outputs “Received
m = Oj” in case Oj 6=⊥ and reports a fail if Oj =⊥.
Otherwise Pj is a valid relay name and Pi generates a random
temp and stores (temp, (Oj , Pj)) in its outgoing buffer and
notifies the environment about temp.
Sending an Onion: When the environment instructs Pi
to forward temp, Pi looks up temp in its buffer. If Pi
does not find such an entry, it aborts. Otherwise, it found
(temp, (Oj , Pj)) and sends Oj to Pj .
To show that any secure OR protocol Π realizes the ideal
functionality, we prove that any attack on the secure OR
protocol can be simulated in the ideal functionality. As the
simulator only gets the outputs of the ideal functionality and
thus no real onions, it simulates them with the closest match it
can create: replacement onions that take the same path (and, if
sent to corrupted receivers, include the same message). Due to
our new security properties, we know that such a replacement
cannot be distinguished. The full proof is included in Appendix
D.
Theorem 7: A secure onion routing protocol following
Definition 9 UC-realizes F in the (FRKR)-hybrid model.
V. SECOND PITFALL: UNDERVALUED ORACLES
We discovered a new attack on HORNET whose existence
cannot be explained with the shortcomings of the properties of
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya. The reason for this attack is not
in the properties used for the proof, but in how the properties
are proven. It turns out that on many occasions the properties
have not been proven correctly; more precisely the oracles
have been wrongly adapted or ignored.
We start this section by describing our attack, then explain
how the oracles have been modified and how the correct use
of oracles detects the attack.
A. Attacking HORNET’s Data Transmission
HORNET was proposed as a network level anonymity system
for the anonymized transmission of arbitrary higher layer
packets. The latter can be expected to match specific formats or
contain interpretable content, e.g. natural language. Hence the
receiver can very likely distinguish real messages from random
bit strings of the same length in HORNET’s transmission phase.
HORNET uses a pseudo-random permutation (PRP) in CBC
mode17 to form layered encryption of its payload, but does not
implement integrity checks at the processing relays for it.
An attacker that controls the first relay18 and the receiver
can link sender and receiver (thus break relationship anonymity
SRL) and this adversary can also link large parts of the
message to its sender (break sender anonymity SML) with
the following attack:
1) The adversary flips bits in the last k blocks of the data
payload of the HORNET packet sent from the sender.
2) The packet is sent through the chain of relays as intended
because the header was not modified and the payload’s
17Note, that the paper is not entirely clear about this point, as it states that
HORNET uses a “stream-cipher”, which would make our attack stronger, “in
CBC mode”, suggesting that instead they actually use a PRP.
18Technically, controlling the link from the sender to the first relay is enough.
However, whether the adversary controls links is not explicitly stated in [11].
integrity is not protected. The payload is decrypted using
the block cipher in CBC mode.
3) The receiver checks the last k blocks. They either contain
random bits (i.e. the sender was communicating with this
receiver and the preceding decrypted blocks contain parts
of the original message) or it conforms to a real message
(i.e. the sender was not communicating with this receiver).
Varying k the success of distinguishing real messages from
some ending with random bit strings can be adjusted at the
cost of learning less about the real message.
1) Varying the Attack for Related Systems: The attack can
be used on related works and the setup phase of HORNET as
well. See Table I for a summary.
a) Sphinx: Sphinx specifies that headers and payload
are encrypted independently of each other. The payload is
encrypted using a bidirectional error propagating block cipher
and protected with an integrity check for the receiver, but not
for processing relays. Further, Sphinx model considers the
receiver to not be part of the anonymization protocol. The
receiver’s address is included in the payload.
Because of the block cipher choice, our attack destroys the
payload completely, and the sender cannot be linked to the
original message content and, if used in the intended model,
the sender can only be linked to the exit node.
However, if Sphinx is used with the receiver as the last
relay (no address needs to be coded in the payload), it remains
possible for a corrupt receiver to determine, who attempted
to communicate with her by using our attack. The receiver
does not even need to be able to distinguish a real message
from random bits, but just has to notice that Sphinx’s integrity
check at the receiver failed.
b) HORNET’s Setup Phase: HORNET’s setup phase uses
Sphinx in the setting that the last relay is the receiver, and
hence the linking of sender and receiver is possible.
c) TARANET: TARANET’s adversary model prevents our
attack. For the sake of completeness, we argue the effect of
our attack when their trust assumption is violated: TARANET
uses HORNET’s Sphinx-based setup phase and thus is prone
to the attack in this phase. Its data transmission phase however
protects the integrity of the complete onion at each hop. Thus,
in this phase the attack fails.
d) Improved Minx: As the original Minx, the improved
one excludes integrity checks for onions; Minx nodes process
all onions they receive. Thus, our attack to link sender and
receiver works under the assumption that the receiver can
distinguish valid messages from random bits. Similar to Sphinx,
both Minx and the improved version employ bidirectional error
propagating block ciphers, so recovering (parts of) the message
after modification is impossible. In contrast to Sphinx, the
improved Minx’s network model already allows for our attack.
2) Ramifications: The described attack lies well within the
adversary model of HORNET: it allows a fraction of nodes
to be actively controlled by the adversary and aims at sender
anonymity, even if the receiver is compromised, and relationship
anonymity, even if one of the end hosts is compromised. It
also lies within the adversary model of the improved Minx as
TABLE I
OBSERVABLE LINKINGS ON DIFFERENT SYSTEMS; (X) IF ATTACK WORKS
ONLY UNDER VIOLATION OF THE ADVERSARY MODEL
System Sender-Message Sender-Receiver Sender-Exit node
Improved Minx X X
Sphinx (receiver 6= exit node) X
Sphinx (receiver = exit node)19 X X
HORNET (Setup) X X
TARANET (Setup) (X) (X)
HORNET (Data) X X X
TARANET (Data)
it is an active tagging attack on the first link that allows to
discover the destination. For Sphinx and Taranet the deviation
from their network resp. adversary model seems to explain the
existence of this attack.
The existence of this attack in HORNET and the improved
Minx however contradicts their security proofs. The reason for
this are not the flaws in the properties of [8], but a common
mistake in proving the properties.
B. Mistake in the Proofs
The shared pitfall are the oracles. In HORNET’s analysis this
attack was excluded as the oracles were not taken into account.
The proof of TARANET ignores the oracles as well, yet its
transmission phase incidentally protects against our attack.
Sphinx, the improved Minx and even an extension in [8] restrict
the oracle in our Step 7 to only allow non-duplicate onions,
i.e. those with a changed header. This weakens the properties
too much, as the limited oracle incidentally loses protection
from modification attacks, where the onion is modified before
it ever reached the honest node.
Note, that our property LU (and even the insecure original
Onion-Security) indeed cannot be fulfilled if the before
mentioned attack (Section V-A) works: The adversary alters
only the payload of the challenge onion and queries the oracle
with the modified onion. As processing at the honest node is
not aborted for modified onions, the adversary learns the next
relay after the honest node. She can thus decide whether the
next relay corresponds to her choice (b = 0) or not (b = 1).
We want to stress that this is not the only attack that prevents
HORNET from achieving LU . Another exploits the usage of
sessions (more in Section VII-C2).
VI. PROVING THE ADAPTED SPHINX SECURE
Sphinx specifies to use a header and a payload. The original
Sphinx [13] suggests per-hop integrity protection only for the
header as an integrity check for the payload conflicts with their
support for replies. Thus, as mentioned in Section V-A Sphinx
allows to link sender and exit node. As this linking is not
possible in the ideal functionality, Sphinx, even with the flaw
from Section IV-A fixed, cannot realize the ideal functionality.
Beato et al. however proposed an adaptation to Sphinx, to
simplify the protocol and improve security and performance
at the cost of losing support for replies [5]. Thereby, they
introduce integrity checks of the payload at each hop. As
19We stress that this model was never intended by Sphinx, but other works
used Sphinx that way.
this prevents the linking attack, we decided to analyze this
version of Sphinx, adapted with the small fix to the attack
from Section IV-A known from the Sphinx implementation,
for compliance with our properties for secure OR protocols.
Note, that in compliance to Beato et al. this variation covers
only the forward phase and no replies.
The proof for Onion-Correctness follows the ideas in [13].
To analyze LU and TI , we successively define games with
marginally weaker adversary models. Arguing how each step
follows from reasonable assumptions, we terminally reduce it
to the security of an authenticated encryption scheme and the
DDH assumption. We provide the detailed proof in Appendix E,
and it leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 8: Beato’s Sphinx variation, adapted with the fix
to the attack from Section IV-A, is a secure OR scheme.
As this implies that it realizes the ideal functionality,
we can conclude that it achieves confidentiality (MO) for
honest senders with honest receivers, and sender (SML)
and relationship anonymity (SRL) for honest senders with
corrupted receivers. This holds for a restricted adversary model,
which does not allow timing attacks or attacks that lead to the
dropping of onions. This limitation conforms to the adversary
model of the original Sphinx, which is used in the adapted
version as well.
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we relate our properties to known attacks
and give further comments about the limitations of using them.
A. Onion-Security Properties vs. Existing OR Attacks
Our new properties prevent well-known attacks on OR if
they comply to the adversary model of the ideal functionality.
Passive linking attacks e.g. based on length of the onion layer, or
the length of the included message are prevented (attacks on LU
would otherwise be possible). Additionally, our properties imply
non-deterministic encryption in FormOnion, as the adversary
could use FormOnion on its chosen parameters and compare
the results, otherwise.
In tagging attacks the attacker modifies an onion and
recognizes it later based on the modification. To be useful,
the tagging has to preserve some information of the original
communication, e.g. a part of the path or the message. This
translates to an attack on LU that uses an oracle to learn the
output of a tagged challenge onion after processing at an honest
relay, and deciding if it relates to the chosen input (b = 0), or
not.
Duplicate attacks assume an adversary that is able to create
an onion that equals an intercepted onion in parts of the
input, e.g. the message, that can later be observed, but is
not bit-identical. Such onions appear different at the relays
and hence may not be detected by duplicate protection. They
still jeopardize anonymity, as the adversary may notice their
repeated delivery to the receiver. Our properties protect from
duplicate attacks, as an adversary that was able to create a
duplicate onion breaks LU by learning the message or path
contained in the challenge onion by using the oracle.
Replay attacks (duplicate attacks with bit-identical onion)
are possible in the ideal functionality and consequently not
necessarily prevented.
The n-1 Attack, where all but one onion is known to the
adversary, and hence the remaining one can be traced, is
possible in the ideal functionality and thus not mitigated by
the properties.
B. Adapting Our Properties
There are cases, in which our properties need adaptation:
Correctness: Due to practical reasons, space-efficient data
structures like Bloom filters are frequently used for duplicate
detection. Bloom filters exhibit false-positive detections (that is
non-duplicate packets are detected as duplicates with a certain
probability), but no false-negatives (duplicates are always
detected). However, the false-positive probability of a Bloom
filter depends on its configuration and is usually not negligible.
This can be covered by extending our Onion-Correctness to
δ-Onion-Correctness, thus accepting a correctness failure at a
probability of at most δ.
The false-positive probability of a Bloom filter depends on its
configuration; that is its size m, the number of hash functions
k and the number of already stored inputs n. The false-positive
probability pk,n,m is:
pk,n,m =
1
mk(n+1)
m∑
i=1
iki!
(
m
i
){
kn
i
}
As a protocol is used, the duplicate store is growing, which
means that for a Bloom filter the number of stored elements n
grows. It follows that the false-positive rate increases and thus
the probability for a correctness failure.
We thus extend Onion-Correctness to δ-Onion-Correctness
such that the probability for a correctness failure is at most δ.
Practically, this can be achived by computing the number of
maximum elements that can be stored for a given Bloom filter
configuration m, k such that pk,n,m ≤ δ. Once the maximum
number is achieved, the system would need to switch keys to
restart duplicate detection using an empty Bloom filter.
Definition 10: (δ-OnionCorrectness) [as in Definition 1]...
the following is true:
1) correct path:
Pr[P(O1, P1) = (P1, . . . , Pn+1)] ≥ 1−δ,
2) correct layering:
Pr[L(O1, P1) = (O1, . . . , On+1)] ≥ 1−δ,
3) correct decryption:
Pr[(m,⊥) = ProcOnion(SK(Pn+1), On+1, Pn+1)]
≥ 1−δ.
Security properties and Cascades: So far we assumed that
the replacement onion is any onion that shares the observed part
of the path. This naturally applies for free routing protocols,
in which the sender randomly picks any path, and which is
considered by the ideal functionality. When analyzing OR with
fixed cascades, some adaptations are necessary. Adaptation
and changes in the analysis for the adapted ideal functionality,
however, are straightforward: senders can only choose a cascade
instead of a path. This results in a different path choice in the
adversary class and thus in a slightly different anonymity set.
In the game, the path of the replacement onion finally has to
match the cascade of the challenge onion (this can be assured
in Step 5 of both LU and TI).
C. Limitations
As limitations of this paper, we recall the adversary model,
the anonymity set, and discuss the limits inherited from the
ideal functionality.
1) Adversary Model and Anonymity Set: We fully assumed
the adversary model of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya. This
adversary model does not allow for traffic analysis as timing
information is removed and no delaying or dropping is allowed
by the adversary. Although this adversary model does not seem
very realistic, the analysis is useful to split the proof. Upon
showing the protocol’s privacy for the restricted adversary
model of the ideal functionality by proving the properties, only
the privacy for the remaining attacks has to be shown.
We restrict the paths in the adversary class to include at least
one honest relay to achieve the notions. This means that the
anonymity set consists only of the users whose onions share
an honest relay and are processed together.
2) Reply Channels and Sessions: All systems that proved
privacy with the properties consider a reply channel, for
example to respond to an anonymous sender. None, however,
analyzes the backward phase separately. They only show
indistinguishability to the forward onions (if at all), implying
that the same security properties are used for the reply channel.
However, our analysis showed that the privacy goals except
confidentiality (MO) are only guaranteed for an honest sender.
In a reply phase this sender is the original receiver, which
cannot ultimately be considered honest. Thus, proving the
properties does not guarantee the anonymity of the initial
sender for a corrupted receiver in the reply phase.
HORNET and TARANET additionally introduce sessions.
Their data transmission phase reuses the same path and header
to efficiently send multiple onions. The ideal functionality does
not cover sessions. As for a corrupted relay it is always possible
to link onions of the same session, neither the properties, nor
ultimately the ideal functionality can be shown in this case.
Besides noticing this insufficiency, sending replies to the
sender or using sessions is outside of the scope of this
paper. We conjecture that both issues can be solved in future
work by changing the ideal functionality and introducing
additional properties. For this paper, we deemed it however
more important to explain and correct all mistakes related to
the simple sending with OR in detail.
D. Some Thoughts about Mix Networks
Mix networks in addition to onion processing include
reordering of onions (usually by delaying them for some time),
to conceal timing information and prevent linking outgoing to
incoming onions based on their order and timing. The ideal
functionality, as well as both the original and our properties
all do not consider timing attacks. Although none of the
widely deployed anonymization systems considers this, a real
anonymous communication network of course should prevent
linking based on timings. From the perspective of this work
we consider this an extension, as all properties presented here
need to be met by mix networks, as well, to prevent linking
based on the onions and their processing at honest nodes.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya have made a seminal attempt
to formally analyze the predominant anonymization approach
of OR in [8]: They design an ideal functionality for OR in
the UC model and suggest properties to analyze protocols and
real-world systems. A whole family of subsequent OR schemes
based their security analyses on this work.
Analyzing approaches from this family, we discovered a
new, severe vulnerability and explained one that was known.
We presented a new attack to completely break sender and
relationship anonymity in HORNET. Further as known and
corrected in the implementation, in Sphinx as in [13] the
anonymity set can be reduced by discovering the used path
length.
As these attacks contradict the proofs in the respective papers,
we set out to formally analyze the used proof strategy proposed
in [8]. First, we confirmed that the foundation of the proof,
the ideal functionality, indeed guarantees privacy.
Second, we explained the reason for the attack on Sphinx:
the properties as originally suggested by Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya are insufficient. To resolve this situation, we fixed
one property, developed two new properties, and proved that
achieving these three properties implies the privacy of the ideal
functionality: sender anonymity and relationship anonymity
against corrupted receivers in an adversary model that limits
onion dropping and timing-based attacks.
Third, we explained the reason for the attack on HORNET:
the original Onion-Security property would have prevented it,
but has been proven incorrectly. Proving a variation of Sphinx
secure, we demonstrated how systems can be analyzed using
our new properties.
We wish to point out that several of the published systems
consider reply channels as well as sessions – which indeed are
not covered by the ideal functionality of [8]. Therefore, much
is left to be done: while we repaired the anonymization for
the simple delivery of a message from a sender to a receiver,
modeling reply channels and sessions is left for future work.
Further, analyses and proofs for the security and privacy of
other onion routing protocols beyond the variation of Sphinx
need to be conducted, by using our or adapted properties.
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APPENDIX
A. Adapted Ideal Functionality
The following description stems from [8]. Adapted parts are
highlighted.
Let us define the ideal onion routing process. Let us
assume that the adversary is static, i.e., each player is either
honest or corrupted from the beginning, and the trusted party
implementing the ideal process knows which parties are honest
and which ones are corrupted.
a) Ideal Onion Routing Functionality: Data Structure:
• The set Bad of parties controlled by the adversary.
• An onion O is stored in the form of
(sid, Ps, Pr,m, n, P, i) where: sid is the identifier,
Ps is the sender, Pr is the recipient, m is the message
sent through the onion routers, n < N is the length
of the onion path, P = (Po1 , ..., Pon) is the path over
which the message is sent (by convention,Po0 = Ps ,
and Pon+1 = Pr ), i indicates how much of the path the
message has already traversed (initially, i = 0). An onion
has reached its destination when i = n+ 1.
• A list L of onions that are being processed by the
adversarial routers. Each entry of the list consists of
(temp,O, j), where temp is the temporary id that the
adversary needs to know to process the onion, while
O = (sid, Ps, Pr,m, n, P, i) is the onion itself, and j is
the entry in P where the onion should be sent next (the
adversary does not get to see O and j). Remark: Note
that entries are never removed from L. This models the
replay attack: the ideal adversary is allowed to resend an
onion.
• For each honest party Pi , a buffer Bi of onions that
are currently being held by Pi . Each entry consists
of (temp′, O), where temp is the temporary id that an
honest party needs to know to process the onion and
O = (sid, Ps, Pr,m, n, P, i) is the onion itself (the
honest party does not get to see O). Entries from this
buffer are removed if an honest party tells the functionality
that she wants to send an onion to the next party.
b) Ideal Onion Routing Functionality: Instructions: The
ideal process is activated by a message from router P , from the
adversary S, or from itself. There are four types of messages,
as follows:
(Process New Onion, Pr,m, n,P). Upon receiving such
a message from Ps, where m ∈ {0, 1} ∪ {⊥}, do:
1) If |P| ≥ N , reject.
2) Otherwise, create a new session id sid randomly , and let
O = (sid, Ps, Pr,m, n,P, 0).
3) If Ps is corrupted, send “start belongs to onion from
Ps with sid, Pr,m, n,P” to the adversary S. Send itself
message (Process Next Step,O).
(Process Next Step,O). This is the core of the ideal
protocol. Suppose O = (sid, Ps, Pr,m, n, P, i). The ideal
functionality looks at the next part of the path. The router
Poi just processed
20 the onion and now it is being passed to
Poi+1 . Corresponding to which routers are honest, and which
ones are adversarial, there are two possibilities for the next
part of the path:
I) Honest next Suppose that the next node, Poi+1 , is honest.
Here, the ideal functionality makes up a random temporary id
temp for this onion and sends to S (recall that S controls the
network so it decides which messages get delivered): Onion
temp from Poi to Poi+1 .If Ps is corrupted it further adds
“temp belongs to onion from Ps with sid, Pr,m, n,P” to the
message for S. It adds the entry (temp,O, i + 1) to list L.
(See (Deliver Message, temp) for what happens next.)
II) Adversary next. Suppose that Poi+1 is adversarial. Then
there are two cases:
• There is an honest router remaining on the path to the
recipient. Let Poj be the next honest router. (I.e., j > i
is the smallest integer such that Poj is honest.) In this
case, the ideal functionality creates a random temporary
id temp for this onion, and sends the message “Onion
temp from Poi , routed through (Poi+1 , ..., Poj−1) to Poj”
to the ideal adversary S, and stores (temp,O, j) on the
list L. If Ps is corrupted it further adds “temp belongs
to onion from Ps with sid, Pr,m, n,P” to the message
for S.
• Poi is the last honest router on the path; in particular,
this means that Pr is adversarial as well. In that case, the
ideal functionality sends the message “Onion from Poi
with message m for Pr routed through (Poi+1 , ..., Pon)”
to the adversary S. If Ps is corrupted it further adds
“end belongs to onion from Ps with sid, Pr,m, n,P” to
the message for S. (Note that if Poi+1 = Pr , the list
(Poi+1 , ..., Pon) will be empty.)
(Deliver Message, temp). This is a message that S sends
to the ideal process to notify it that it agrees that the onion with
temporary id temp should be delivered to its current destination.
To process this message, the functionality checks if the tempo-
rary identifier temp corresponds to any onion O on the list L.
If it does, it retrieves the corresponding record (temp,O, j)
and updates the onion: if O = (sid, Ps, Pr,m, n,P, i),replaces
i with j to indicate that we have reached the jth router on the
path of this onion. If j < n+1,generates a temporary identifier
temp′ , sends Onion temp′ received to party Poj , and stores
the resulting pair (temp′, O = (sid, Ps, Pr,m, n,P, j) in the
buffer Boj of party Poj . Otherwise, j = n+ 1, so the onion
has reached its destination: if m 6=⊥ it sends Message m
received to router Pr ; otherwise it does not deliver anything21
.
(Forward Onion, temp′). This is a message from an
honest ideal router Pi notifying the ideal process that it is
ready to send the onion with id temp′ to the next hop. In
response, the ideal functionality
20In case i = 0, processed means having originated the onion and submitted
it to the ideal process.
21 This is needed to account for the fact that the adversary inserts onions
into the network that at some point do not decrypt correctly.
• Checks if the temporary identifier temp′ corresponds to
any entry in Bi . If it does, it retrieves the corresponding
record (temp′, O).
• Sends itself the message (Process Next Step,O).
• Removes (temp′, O) from Bi .
This concludes the description of the ideal functionality. We
must now explain how the ideal honest routers work. When
an honest router receives a message of the form Onion temp′
received from the ideal functionality, it notifies environment Z
about it and awaits instructions for when to forward the onion
temp′ to its next destination. When instructed by Z , it sends
the message Forward Onion temp′ to the ideal functionality.
B. Analysis of F
1) Formal Definitions:
a) Game: The model uses r = (u, u′,m, aux) to denote
the communication of message m from sender u to receiver
u′ with auxiliary information aux. Communications that are
processed together are grouped in batches r. For the game
the adversary has to decide on two scenarios. Those are a
sequence of pairs of batches. The challenger verifies for every
pair of batches r0, r1 that they comply to the currently analyzed
privacy notion, i.e. differ only in private information. If the pair
of batches is valid regarding the notion, the challenger picks
a random b and simulates the protocol for the corresponding
batch rb. Then the adversary can issue more valid batches and
finally has to make a guess g for b. If any adversary cannot
achieve a better probability of guessing g = b correctly as
negligibly bigger than 12 , the notion is achieved as nothing
about the private information can be learned.
b) Important Notions: To keep the formal definitions
of the notions short, we always consider the following:
Let the checked batches be r0, r1, which for b ∈ {0, 1}
include the communications rbj = (ubj , u
′
bj
,mbj , auxbj ) with
j ∈ {1, . . . l}.
For MO two batches may only differ in the messages:
Definition 11 (MO i.a. w. [25]): The batches are valid for
MO, iff for all j ∈ {1, . . . l}: r1j = (u0j , u′0j ,m1j , aux0j ).
For SML only the senders may differ and further each
sender has to send the same number of messages in the
two batches. To define this, [25] formally defines Qb.
Here we use a less formal description: Qb := {(u, n) |
u sends n messages in rb}.
Definition 12 (SML i.a. w. [25]): The batches are valid for
SML, iff for all j ∈ {1, . . . l} : r1j = (u1j , u′0j ,m0j , aux0j )
and Q0 = Q1.
RML is analogous to SML, but for receivers: Q′b :=
{(u′, n) | u′ receives n messages in rb}.
Definition 13 (RML i.a. w. [25]): The batches are valid for
RML, iff for all j ∈ {1, . . . l} : r1j = (u0j ,u′1j ,m0j , aux0j )
and Q′0 = Q
′
1.
SRL allows only sender and receiver to differ and has the
complex requirement MSR. MSR is defined formally in [25]
and requires that two senders and receivers in both batches
are mixed in the following way: The batches only differ in
two senders (A,C) and two receivers (B,D). In the case
A      B A      D
C      D C      B
A      B A      D
C      D C      B
either this 
order
or this 
order
batch 0 batch 1
Fig. 10. Batches in MSR illustrated
b = 0: A must communicate with B, and C with D; in the
case b = 1: A with D, and C with B. The order of those
two communications in the batch is chosen randomly by the
challenger. Before, between and after those communications
multiple communications that are equal in both batches can
occur. The possible communications are depicted in Fig. 10.
Definition 14 (SRL i.a. w. [25]): The batches are valid for
SRL, iff for all j ∈ {1, . . . l} : r1j = (u1j ,u′1j ,m0j , aux0j )
and MSR.
c) Corruption: Corruption is realized with special corrupt-
queries. They return internal information of the corrupted user
(keys, current state etc.). Xc0 ensures that the adversary is
not allowed to send any corrupt-query. The other corruption
options add requirements for the two batches of the adversary
to be considered valid.
Definition 15 (Corruption): Let Uˆ be the set of all users
corrupted via corrupt-queries. The following corruption options
are met, iff for all a ∈ {0, 1}:
Xs : ∀(u, u′,m, aux) ∈ r0 ∪ r1 : u 6∈ Uˆ
Xe : ∀uˆ ∈ Uˆ : r0i = (uˆ, ,m, ) =⇒ r1i = (uˆ, ,m, )
∧ r0i = ( , uˆ,m, ) =⇒ r1i = ( , uˆ,m, )
d) More Notions: Here we introduce the notions not
achieved by F for some adversary models. We need them to
prove that the shown achieved notions are indeed the strongest
OR, i.e. F achieves for this adversary model.
MO − |M | (Message Unobservability leaking Message
Length) is defined as MO except that also the length of the
messages needs to be equal for the messages of both batches.
(SM)L (Pair Sender-Message Unlinkability) is defined as
SRL except that instead of the combination of two self-chosen
senders and receivers, the combination of two self-chosen
senders and messages needs to be guessed. (RM)L is similar
but for receivers and messages.
(SR)O (Sender-Receiver Unobservability) is defined similar
to SRL except that instead of both communications (b = 0 :
A-B, C-D; b = 1 : A-D, C-B), only one of the two self-
chosen senders and one of the two self-chosen receivers is
randomly chosen. The adversary has to decide whether one
of the b = 0 communications (A-B or C-D) or one of the
b = 1 communications (A-D or C-B) was simulated. (SM)O
is similar, but for senders and messages. (RM)O is similar,
but for receivers and messages.
(2S)L (Twice Sender Unlinkability) allows batches that only
differ in the senders of two messages. For b = 0 those two
messages are sent by the same sender, for b = 1 from different
senders. Thus, the adversary has to be able decide that two
messages are from the same sender to break it. (2R)L is similar,
but for receivers.
RML − P ′ allows batches to only differ in the receivers
and requires that the messages partitioned into the sets that
are received by the same receiver are equal in both batches.
For example, if there is a certain receiver B in the batch 0
that receives m1,m3,m17, then there has to be a receiver B′,
e.g. D, in batch 1 that receives the same set of messages
m1,m3,m17.
SFL−P like SML allows the batches to differ only in the
senders. However, it allows the number of times a sender sends
to differ in the batches as well. Only the messages partitioned
into the sets that are send by the same sender have to be equal
in both batches. For example, A might send only m1 in batch
0, but m2,m3,m5 in batch 1, as long as another user A′ sends
only m1 in batch 1 and another user than A, e.g. A′′, sends
only m2,m3,m5 in batch 0.
2) Ideal Functionality against Restricted Adversary:
Lemma 1: F achieves MOe for C.
Proof: We go through the messages of the ideal functionality
F and check whether they help to distinguish two scenarios
differing only in the messages of honest users.
Process New Onion: Does only output information to the
adversary for corrupted senders, which will be equal (m,P
etc.) or randomly generated (sid) in both scenarios because of
Xe.
Process Next Step: Information output for corrupted senders
is equal or random because of Xe. Hence, we can focus
on honest senders. As corrupted receivers receive the same
messages and everything else is equal in both scenarios, the
adversary gets identical output for corrupted receivers. For
honest receivers the adversary only gets messages “Onion
temp from Poi routed through (Poi+1 , . . . , Poj−1 to Poj )” or
“Onion temp from Poi to Poi+1”. Since everything except the
messages is equal in both scenarios, the path is equal in both
scenarios and does not help the adversary distinguish. Further
temp is generated randomly by F and hence does not help
the adversary distinguish.
Deliver Message: Because of the adversary class C the
attacker cannot exploit sending such messages.
Forward Onion: Is a message between honest routers and
the ideal functionality. Hence, the adversary cannot influence
it or get information from it.
Lemma 2: F achieves SMLs for C.
Proof: Xs excludes corrupted senders and hence, we can
ignore outputs that happen for corrupted senders. C forbids
the misuse of “Deliver Message” and hence all onions went
through the network by honest processing of the routers and
no onions can be replayed or delayed.
Then the ideal functionality only outputs every part on
the path between honest routers once, and if the receiver is
corrupted the message once, for all communications that the
adversary picked for the chosen scenario. C also guarantees
that all paths share a common honest router. Let Ptohonest be
the set of paths that lead to the honest router and Pfromhonest
the set with paths that start from the honest router. Since C
chooses at least one honest router, such that the maximum
path length is met, i.e. any of the possible path combinations
Ptohonest×Pfromhonest are shorter than N . Because of C, the
outputs will additionally be in mixed order and not linkable
because of the order in which she observes them. No path
combination can be excluded by the adversary, as all are valid
paths, and hence she has no information that helps her deciding
on the total path. Further, she only learns which receiver
receives which message. Since, this is the only information
she has and she cannot exclude any path, she cannot do better
than to randomly guess the sender-receiver and hence sender-
message pairs.
Lemma 3: F achieves RML0 for C.
Proof: X0 excludes that the adversary learns different
receiver-message combinations as outputs of F as the message
is never output in this case. The only other option to distinguish
the scenarios is to exploit that the adversary knows which
message is sent by which sender. However, as argued in the
proof of Lemma 2, it is not possible to link the parts of the
path for C.
Lemma 4: F does not achieve any notion (of the hierarchy
in [25]) not implied by MOe, SMLs or RML0 for C.
Proof: We need to show, that F does not achieve any
of the lowest notions in the hierarchy that are not already
implied by MOe, SMLs or RML0 for C: (SR)O0,
(2S)L0, (2R)L0, SFL− P 0, RFL− P ′0. This implies
that also no stronger notions can be achieved, even without
user corruption. Further, we show, that with differing
behavior at corrupted receivers allowed it does not achieve
(SM)Os,(RM)Ls,(RM)Os,MO − |M |s,RML− P ′s,
SRLe. This implies that no MOs can be achieved.
Obviously, as for corrupted senders all information about
the communication is sent to the adversary, no notion can
be achieved against differing behavior at corrupted senders
allowed.
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Fig. 11. From [25] Depicting example inputs for notions: a) SRL, b)(SR)O,
c)(2S)L
a) (SR)O0: The attack works as follows: We use the
communication of users A,B, C,D according to the definition
of (SR)O (see Figure 11 b).
Now, the ideal functionality F will output “Onion temp from
S to X1” with S being A or C. We will use Deliver Message
for temp and continue getting messages “Onion temp from
X1 to X2” and using Deliver Message for temp until we
get a message “Onion temp from X1 to R” with R being B
or D. We guess the scenario that includes the linking between
S and R.
b) (2S)L0 ((2R)L0 analogous): We use senders A and
C for the two instances of the two scenarios according to Figure
11 c). In this case, we do not need to use Deliver Message
even once; we just wait for the first messages the ideal
functionality sends in Process Next Step “Onion temp from
S1 to X” and “Onion temp from S2 to X”, if those two senders
are the same, we guess g = 0, otherwise g = 1.
c) (SM)Os: Analogous to (SR)O0, except that we
exploit to pick a corrupted receiver and hence get the delivered
message as output from the ideal functionality.
d) (RM)Ls,(RM)Os, MO − |M |s, RML− P ′s: We
are allowed to pick corrupted receivers, hence we do and get
the receiver-message linking output from the ideal functionality
in the “Onion from x with message m for r routed through ...”-
message after we used Deliver Message whenever possible.
e) SRLe: We choose a corrupted sender that sends
to different receivers. Thus, we learn to which receiver the
corrupted sender sends it message and hence learn the linking of
the message and the receiver and win the game with certainty.
f) SFL− P 0(RFL− P ′0 analogous): We pick scenar-
ios that differ in how often A sends, e.g. b = 0: A sends
once, C k-times; b = 1 : A sends k-times, C once. The
ideal functionality will output the parts of the path of all
communications. If A occurs more often in those parts of the
path, we guess g = 1, if C occurs more often g = 0, otherwise
we guess randomly.
Thus, we win if A (resp. C) is picked at most k − 2 times
as a random relay in b = 0 (resp. b = 1). This happens if
it is not chosen as the common honest relay ( 1#honestrelays )
and not chosen more often randomly as relay (( N−1#P−1 )
k +
( N−1#P−1 )
k−1 ·( 1#P−1 )). Thus, we win with probablity of at least
1−( 1#honestrelays +( N−1#P−1 )k+( N−1#P−1 )k−1 ·( 1#P−1 )), which
is a non negligible advantage if #P > N for an appropriately
chosen k.
C. Protocol Extension
Algorithm 2: FormOnionwi(m, (P ), (PK))
/** on input: path (P ) = (P1, . . . , Pn+1), public router
keys (PK) = (PK1, . . . , PKn)**/
generate symmetric keys for all on-path routers excluding
receiver
(k1, . . . , kn)
R←− ({0, 1}λ)n
use original FormOnion
(O1, . . . , On+1)← FormOnion(m, (P1, . . . , Pn+1),
(PK1, . . . , PKn+1))
generate encrypted dummy paddings
(rdm1, . . . , rdmn)←
CalculateEncryptedRandom(n, (k1, . . . , kn))
generate encrypted tag paddings
(tags1, . . . , tagsn)←
CalculateTags(n, (PK1, . . . , PKn), (O1, . . . , On+1),
(rdm1, . . . , rdmn))
Combine extensions to create new onions
(O′1, . . . , O
′
n+1)←
(O1‖tags1‖rdm1, . . . , On+1‖tagsn+1‖rdmn+1)
return (O′1, . . . , O′n+1)
Algorithm 3: CalculateEncryptedRandom(n, (P ), (k))
/**on input: path length n, router identities on the path
(P ) = (P1, . . . , Pn), router keys (k) = (k1, . . . , kn)**/
pick random padding blocks
(B1, . . . , BN )
R←− (Casym)N
simulate processing on routers
for i← 1 to n do
Save parts that will not be replaced by tags
rdmi = (Bn−(i−1), . . . , BN )
Process as processed by router i
(B1, . . . , BN )← ProcPadding(ki, Pi, B1, . . . , BN )
end
return (rdm1, . . . , rdmn)
Algorithm 4: CalculateTags(n, (PK), (k), (O), (B))
/** on input: path length n, public router keys
(PK) = (PK1, . . . , PKn), symmetric router keys
(k) = (k1, . . . , kn), onion layers (O) = (O1, . . . , On+1)
and padding blocks (B) = (B1, . . . , BN ) **/
Calculate tags including tags of later routers for all
routers
for i← n to 1 do
Save parts that include tags
tagsi = (B1, . . . , Bn−i)
Calculate and include tag needed for router i:
1)encrypt all previous blocks
(B′1, . . . , B
′
N−1)←
(Encsym(ki, B1), . . . , Encsym(ki, BN−1))
2)generate tag and embed together with key
ti ← Sig(ki, (Oi+1‖B′1‖ . . . ‖B′N−1))
Bnew ← Encasym(PKi, embed(ki, ti))
3)Shift blocks and include new block containing the
tag
(B1, . . . , BN )← (Bnew, B′1, . . . , B′N−1)
end
return (tags1, . . . , tagsn)
Example on extension for N = 3 and n = 2:
Let Easympk (·) (Dasymsk (·)) denote asymmetric encryption (de-
cryption) under key pk (sk) and Esymk (·) (Dsymk (·)) denote
symmetric encryption (decryption). Further, let t ← Sk(·)
(Vk(t, ·)) denote symmetric signing (verification) for a given
MAC system under key k. The sender will generate N − n
random blocks (1 in this case denoted d1
R←− Casym). Onion
O1 will carry an extension with N blocks, denoted B1, B2, B3.
Block B1 will be the block processed by router P1 and Bi
(recoded) by router Pi. Let R1, R2 be pseudo-random blocks
generated using PRNG(ki).
• Router P1 will receive O′1 =
O1 ‖ EasymPK1 (k1, t1) ‖ E
sym
k1
(EasymPK2 (k2, t2)) ‖ d1.
• Router P2 will receive O′2 =
O2 ‖ EasymPK2 (k2, t2) ‖ D
sym
k1
(d1) ‖ PRNG(k1).
• Receiver P3 will receive O′3 =
Algorithm 5: ProcOnionwi(SKi, Oi, Pi)
Oi has the form O′i‖exti, length of exti is according to
N and λ otherwise splitOnion aborts processing
(O′i, exti)← splitOnion(Oi)
(Pi+1, Oi+1)← ProcOnion(SKi, O′i, Pi)
(B1, . . . , BN )← splitExtension(exti)
Return if receiver
if Pi+1 = ⊥ then
return (⊥, Oi+1)
end
Extract symmetric key and tag
(ki, ti)← extract(Decasym(SKi, B1))
Abort if invalid tag received
if V (ki, ti, (Oi+1‖B2‖ . . . ‖BN )) 6= 1 then
return (⊥,⊥)
end
Generate pseudo-random cipthertext for padding
padi+1 ← ProcPadding(ki, B1, . . . , BN )
O′i+1 ← Oi+1‖padi+1
return (Pi+1, O′i+1)
Algorithm 6: ProcPadding(ki, Pi, B1, . . . , BN )
ri ← PRNG(KDF (Pi, ki))
padi+1 ← (Decsym(ki, B2), . . . , Decsym(ki, BN ), ri)
return padi+1
O3 ‖ Dsymk2 (D
sym
k1
(d1)) ‖ Dsymk2 (PRNG(k1)) ‖ PRNG(k2).
Tags are calculated as
• t1 ← Sk1(O2 ‖ Esymk1 (E
asym
PK2
(k2, t2)) ‖ d1)
• t2 ← Sk2(O3 ‖ Dsymk1 (d1) ‖ PRNG(k1))
Adaption for Counterexample from Section IV-C1:
In CalculateTags the tag in Step 2) is generated over
ID‖Oi+1‖B′1‖ . . . ‖B′N−1 instead of Oi+1‖B′1‖ . . . ‖B′N−1.
The validity check in ProcOnion is adapted accordingly.
Therefore, ID cannot the modified or the check fails: assumed
characteristic (2). As the rest of the extension is calculated as
before, assumed property (1) follows from the adversary not
learning more. Additionally, to the constructed extension the
random ID is attached, which implies characteristic (3).
D. Proof of new Properties
Our proof follows in large parts the argumentation from [8].
For UC-realization, we show that every attack on the real
world protocol Π can be simulated by an ideal world attack
without the environment being able to distinguish those. We first
describe the simulator S. Then we show indistinguishability
of the environment’s view in the real and ideal world.
1) Constructing S: S interacts with the ideal functionality
F as the ideal world adversary, and simulates the real-world
honest parties for the real world adversary A. All outputs A
does are forwarded to the environment by S.
First, S carries out the trusted set-up stage: it generates public
and private key pairs for all the real-world honest parties. S
then sends the respective public keys to A and receives the
real world corrupted parties public keys from A.
There are two challenges for the simulator: First, it has to
convincingly mimic the communications of honest senders for
A. As the environment initiates those communications in the
ideal world, S has to use the limited information the ideal
world gives about those communications to build onions in the
simulated real world. Therefore, S needs to store the translation
of the temp ID that was used in the ideal world with the onion
S replaced it with. S stores those mappings on the r-list.
Each entry (onionr, nextRelay, temp) represents the onion
onionr that S expects to receive as honest party nextRelay
from A (either from the link between honest parties or from an
adversarial relay) and its corresponding temp ID. This temp
ID is used to allow the onion to continue its path in F if the
corresponding onion is sent to nextRelay. Secondly, S has to
convincingly mimic the communications of adversarial senders
in F , such that Z does not notice a difference. In the case
of an adversarial sender starting to communicate, S (as the
honest relay) receives an onion from A. S stores the processing
of this onion together with the hop receiving the processing
and all information on the O-list. As in F all information to
communications with adversarial senders is output on every
step of the path, S can easily map the correct onion to the
communication once it occurs in the ideal functionality.
The simulator S maintains two internal data structures:
• The r-list consisting of tuples of the form
(rtemp, nextRelay, temp). Each entry in this list
corresponds to a stage in processing an onion that belongs
to a communication of an honest sender. By stage, we
mean that the next action to this onion is adversarial
(i.e. it is sent over a link or processed by an adversarial
router).
• The O-list containing onions sent by corrupted senders
together with the information about the communication
(onion, nextRelay, information).
We now describe what the simulator does when it receives
a message from the ideal functionality and then describe what
it does when it receives a message from the adversary.
a) S’s behavior on a message from F: In case the
received output belongs to an adversarial sender’s commu-
nication22:
Case I: “start belongs to onion from PS with
sid, Pr,m, n,P”. This is just the result of Ss reaction to an
onion from A that was not the protocol-conform processing of
an honest sender’s communication (Case VIII). S does nothing.
Case II: any output together with “temp belongs to onion
from PS with sid, Pr,m, n,P” for temp 6∈ {start, end}. This
means an honest relay is done processing an onion received
from A that was not the protocol-conform processing of
an honest sender’s communication (processing that follows
Case VII). S finds (onion, nextRelay, information) with
this inputs as information in the O-list (notice that there has
22S knows whether they belong to an adversarial sender from the output it
gets
to be such an entry) and sends the onion onion to nextRelay if
it is an adversarial one, or it sends onion, as if it is transmitted,
to the A’s party representing the link between the currently
processing honest relay and the honest nextRelay.
Case III: any output together with “end belongs to onion
from PS with sid, Pr,m, n,P”. This is just the result of S’s
reaction to an onion from A. S does nothing.
In case the received output belongs to an honest sender’s
communication:
Case IV: “Onion temp from Poi routed through () to Poi+1”.
In this case S needs to make it look as though an onion
was passed from the honest party Poi to the honest party
Poi+1 : S picks pseudo-randomly (with temp as seed) a path
Prdm, of valid length that includes the sequence of Poi to
Poi+1 starting at node j, and a message mrdm. S calculates
(O1, . . . , On) ← FormOnion(mrdm,Prdm, (PK)Prdm) and
sends the onion Oj+1 toA’s party representing the link between
the honest relays as if it was sent from Poi to Poi+1 . S stores
(Oj+1,Poi+1 ,temp) on the r-list. Processing is continued once
Oj+1 is sent by A.
Case V: “Onion temp from Poi routed through
(Poi+1 , . . . , Poj−1) to Poj”. In this case both Poi and Poj are
honest, while the intermediate (Poi+1 , . . . , Poj−1 ) are adver-
sarial. S picks pseudo-randomly (with temp as seed) a path
Prdm of valid length that includes the sequence of Poi to Poj
starting at the k-th node and a message mrdm and calculates
(O1, . . . , On) ← FormOnion(mrdm,Prdm, (PK)Prdm) and
sends the onion Ok+1 to Poi+1 , as if it came from Poi . S
stores (Ok+j−i, Poj , temp) on the r-list.
Case VI: “Onion from Poi with message m for Pr routed
through (Poi+1 , . . . , Pon)”. In this case, Poi is honest while
everyone else is adversarial, including the recipient Pr. This
means that some honest party sent a message to the dis-
honest party Pr. S picks randomly a path Prdm of valid
length that includes the sequence of Poi to Pr at the end
(staring at the k-th node) and calculates (O1, . . . , On) ←
FormOnion(mt,Prdm, (PK)Prdm) and sends the onion Ok+1
to Poi+1 , as if it came from Poi .
b) S’s behavior on a message from A: Let us now
describe what the simulator S does upon receipt of a message
from the adversary. Suppose the simulator S, as real world
honest party Pi, received an onion O from the adversary A as
adversarial player Pa. Notice that this onion can be the protocol-
conform processing of an onion from a communication of an
honest sender, the non-protocol-conform processing of such
an onion or the begin of a communication of an adversarial
sender.
Case VII: (O,Pi, temp) is on the r-list for some temp. In
this case O is the protocol-conform processing of an onion
from a communication of an honest sender. S calculates
ProcOnion(SK(Pi), O, Pi). If it returns a fail (O is a replay
that is detected and dropped by Π), S does nothing. Otherwise,
S sends the message (Deliver Message, temp) to F .
Case VIII. (O,Pi, temp) is not on the r-list for any
temp. S calculates ProcOnion(SK(Pi), O, Pi) = (O′, P ′).
We distinguish the case where a next hop exists and not.
(a) P ′ =⊥: Poj is the recipient and O′ is a message or
a fail symbol. This means that in the real-world protocol,
this onion gets to real-life Pi , and Pi receives the mes-
sage or outputs the fail report. S thus sends the message
(ProcessNewOnion, Pi, O
′, n, ()) to F on Pa’s behalf and
as A already delivered this message to the honest party sends
(Deliver Message, temp) for the belonging temp (Notice that
S knows which temp belongs to this communication as it is
started at an adversarial party Pa).
(b) P ′ 6=⊥: S picks a message m ∈ M. S sends on Pa’s
behalf the message, Process New Onion(P ′,m, n, ()) from
Pi and Deliver Message(temp) for the belonging temp
(Notice that S knows the temp as in case (a)) to F . S adds
the entry (O′, P ′, (Pa, sid, P ′,m, n, ())) to the O-list.
This concludes the description of the simulator.
2) Indistinguishability: Let us now argue that the simulator
actually works, i.e., that the distribution of the player’s outputs
in the real world and in the ideal world are the same. We
proceed by a more or less standard hybrid argument. Consider
the following set of hybrid machines:
Hybrid H0. This machine sets up the keys for the honest
parties (so it has their secret keys). Then it interacts with the
environment and A on behalf of the honest parties. It invokes
the real protocol for the honest parties in interacting with A.
Hybrid H11. In this hybrid, for one communication the onion
layers from its honest sender to the next honest node (relay
or receiver) are replaced with random onion layers embedding
the same path. More precisely, this machine acts like H0
except that the consecutive onion layers O1, O2, . . . , Oj from
an honest sender P0 to the next honest node Pj are replaced
with O¯1, . . . , O¯j where O¯i = O′k+i with (O
′
1, . . . , O
′
n) ←
FormOnion(mrdm,Prdm, (PK)Prdm) where mrdm is a ran-
dom message, P a random path that includes the sequence
from P0 to Pj starting at the k-th node. H11 keeps a O¯-list and
stores (O¯j , Pj ,ProcOnion(SKPj , Oj , Pj)) on it. If an onion
O˜ is sent to Pj , the machine tests if processing results in a fail
(replay detected and dropped). If it does not, H11 compares O˜
to all O¯j on its O¯-list where the second entry is Pj . If it finds
a match, the belonging ProcOnion(SKPj , Oj , Pj) is used as
processing result of Pj . Otherwise, ProcOnion(SKPj , O˜, Pj)
is used.
H0 ≈I H11. The environment gets notified when an honest
party receives an onion layer and inputs when this party is
done. As we just exchange onion layers by others, the behavior
to the environment is indistinguishable for both machines. We
argue indistinguishability in the outputs to A as well:
A observes the onion layers after P0 and if it sends an
onion to Pj the result of the processing after the honest node.
Depending on the behavior of A three cases occur: A drops the
onion belonging to this communication before Pj , A behaves
protocol-conform and sends the expected onion to Pj or A
modifies the expected onion before sending it to Pj . Notice
that dropping the onion leaves the adversary with less output.
Hence, if the case of more outputs cannot be distinguish, neither
the case with less outputs can. Thus, we can focus on the other
cases.
We assume there exists a distinguisher D between H0 and
H11 and construct a successful attack on LU :
The attack receives key and name of the honest relay and
uses the input of the replaced communication as choice for the
challenge, where it replaces the name of the first honest relay
with the one that it got from the challenger23. For the other
relays the attack decides on the keys as A (for corrupted) and
the protocol (for honest) does. It receives (O˜,ProcOnion(Oj))
from the challenger. The attack uses D. For D it simulates
all communications except the one chosen for the challenge,
with the oracles and knowledge of the protocol and keys.
(This includes that for bit-identical onions for which the oracle
cannot be used, depending on whether the protocol has replay
protection ProcOnion(Oj) is reused or the onion is dropped.)
For simulating the challenge communication the attack hands
O˜ to A as soon as D instructs to do so. To simulate further for
D it uses O˜ to calculate the later layers and does any actions
A does on the onion.
A either sends the honest processing of O˜ to the challenge
router or A modifies it to f(O˜). In the first case, the attack
simulates corresponding to ProcOnion(Oj). In the second
case, f(O˜) is given to the oracle and the simulation is done
for the returned ProcOnion(f(O˜)).
Thus, either the challenger chose b = 0 and the attack
behaves like H0 under D; or the challenger chose b = 1 and
the attack behaves like H11 under D. The attack outputs the
same bit as D does for its simulation to win with the same
advantage as D can distinguish the hybrids.
Hybrid H∗1. In this hybrid, for one communication, for
which they had not been replaced, onion layers from an honest
sender to the next honest node are replaced with a random
onion sharing this path.
H11 ≈I H∗1. Analogous above. Apply argumentation of
indistinguishability (H0 ≈I H11) for every replaced subpath.24
Hybrid H12. In this hybrid, for one communication (and
all its replays) for which in the adversarial processing no
modification occurred25 onion layers between two consecutive
honest relays (the second might be the receiver) are replaced
with random onion layers embedding the same path. More
precisely, this machine acts like H∗1 except that the processing
of Oj (and, if no replay protection, the processing result of all
replays of Oj); i.e. the consecutive onion layers Oj+1, . . . , Oj′
from a communication of an honest sender, starting at the
next honest node Pj to the next following honest node Pj′ ,
are replaced with O¯j+1, . . . , O¯j′ . Thereby, O¯j+1 = O′j+k+1
with (O′1, . . . , O
′
n) ← FormOnion(mrdm,Prdm, (PK)Prdm)
where mrdm is a random message, P a random path that
includes the sequence from Pj to Pj′ starting at the k-th node.
H12 stores (O¯j′ , Pj′ ,ProcOnion(SKPj′ , Oj′ , Pj′)) on the O¯-
23As both honest nodes are randomly drawn this does not change the success
24Technically, we need the onion layers as used in H11 (with replaced
onion layers between a honest sender and first honest node) in this case.
Hence, slightly different than before the attack needs to simulate the other
communications not only by the oracle use and processing, but also by replacing
some onion layers (between the honest sender and first honest node) with
randomly drawn ones as H11 does.
25We treat modifying adversaries later in a generic way.
list. Like in H∗1 if an onion O˜ is sent to Pj′ , processing is first
checked for a fail. If it does not fail , H12 compares O˜ to all O¯j′
on its O¯-list where the second entry is Pj′ . If it finds a match,
the belonging ProcOnion(SKPj′ , Oj′ , Pj′) is used as process-
ing result of Pj′ . Otherwise, ProcOnion(SKPj′ , O˜, Pj′) is
used.
H∗1 ≈I H12. H12 replaces for one communication (and all
its replays), the first subpath between two consecutive honest
nodes after an honest sender. The output to A includes the
earlier (by H∗1) replaced onion layers O¯earlier before the first
honest relay (these layers are identical in H∗1 and H12) that
take the original subpath but are otherwise chosen randomly;
the original onion layers after the first honest relay for all
communications not considered by H12 (outputted by H∗1) or in
case of the communication considered by H12, the newly drawn
random replacement (generated by H12); and the processing
after Pj′ .
The onions O¯earlier are chosen independently at random
by H∗1 such that they embed the original path between an
honest sender and the first honest relay, but contain a random
message and random valid path before the honest sending
relay and after the next following honest relay. As they are
replaced by the original onion layers after Pj (there was no
modification for this communication) and include a random
path and message, onions O¯earlier cannot be linked to onions
output by Pj . Hence, the random onions before the first honest
node do not help distinguishing the machines.
Thus, all that is left to distinguish the machines, is the
original/replaced onion layer after the first honest node and the
processing afterwards. This is the same output as in H0 ≈I H11.
Hence, if there exists a distinguisher between H∗1 and H12 there
exists an attack on LU .
Hybrid H∗2. In this hybrid, for all communications, one
communication (and all its replays) at a time is selected. Within
that communication, the next (from sender to receiver) non-
replaced subpath between two consecutive honest nodes is
chosen. If A previously (i.e. in onion layers up to the honest
node starting the selected subpath) modified an onion layer in
this communication, the communication is skipped. Otherwise,
the onion layers between those honest nodes are replaced with
a random onion sharing the path.
H12 ≈I H∗2. Analogous above.
Hybrid H13. In this hybrid, for one communication (and
all its replays) for which in the adversarial processing no
modification occurred so far, onion layers from its last honest
relay to the corrupted receiver are replaced with random
onions sharing this path and message. More precisely, this
machine acts like H∗2 except that the processing of Oj (and,
if no replay protection, the processing result of all replays
of Oj); i.e. the consecutive onion layers Oj+1, . . . , On from
a communication of an honest sender, starting at the last
honest node Pj to the corrupted receiver Pn are replaced with
O¯j+1, . . . , O¯n. Thereby O¯i = O′k+i with (O
′
1, . . . , O
′
n′) ←
FormOnion(m,Prdm, (PK)Prdm) where m is the message
of this communication26, Prdm a random path that includes
the sequence from Pj to Pn starting at the k-th node.
H∗2 ≈I H13. Similar to H∗1 ≈I H12 the onion layers before
Pj are independent and hence do not help distinguishing. The
remaining outputs suffice to construct an attack on TI similar
to the one on LU in H∗1 and H12.
Hybrid H∗3. In this hybrid, for one communication (and
all its replays) for which in the adversarial processing no
modification occurred so far and for which the onion layers
from its last honest relay to corrupted receiver have not
been replaced before, the onion layers between those nodes
are replaced with random onion layers sharing the path and
message.
H13 ≈I H∗3. Analogous above.
Hybrid H4 This machine acts the way that S acts in
combination with F . Note that H∗3 only behaves differently
from S in (a) routing onions through the honest parties and
(b) where it gets its information needed for choosing the
replacement onion layers: (a) H∗3 actually routes them through
the real honest parties that do all the computation. H4, instead
runs the way that F and S operate: there are no real honest
parties, and the ideal honest parties do not do any crypto work.
(b) H∗3 gets inputs directly from the environment and gives
output to it. In H4 the environment instead gives inputs to F
and S gets the needed information (i.e. parts of path and the
included message, if the receiver is corrupted) from outputs
of F as the ideal world adversary. F gives the outputs to the
environment as needed. Further, H∗3 chooses the replacement
onion layers randomly, but identical for replays, while S
chooses them pseudo-randomly depending on an in F randomly
chosen temp, which is identical for replays.
H∗3 ≈I H4. For the interaction with the environment from the
protocol/ideal functionality, it is easy to see that the simulator
directly gets the information it needs from the outputs of the
ideal functionality to the adversary: whenever an honest node
is done processing, it needs the path from it to the next honest
node or path from it to the corrupted receiver and in this case
also the message. This information is given to S by F .
Further, in the real protocol, the environment is notified by
honest nodes when they receive an onion together with some
random ID that the environment sends back to signal that the
honest node is done processing the onion. The same is done
in the ideal functionality. Notice that the simulator ensures
that every communication is simulated in F such that those
notifications arrive at the environment without any difference.
For the interaction with the real world adversary, we
distinguish the outputs in communications from honest and
corrupted senders. 0) Corrupted senders: In the case of a
corrupted sender both H∗3 and H4 (i.e. S+F) do not replace
any onion layers except that with negligible probability a
collision on the O¯-list resp. O-list occurs.
1)Honest senders: 1.1) No modification of the onion by the
adversary happens: All parts of the path are replaced with
randomly drawn onion layers O¯i. The way those layers are
26H13 knows this message as it communicates with the environment.
chosen is identical for H∗3 and H4 (i.e. S+ F). 1.2) Some
modification of the onion or a drop or insert happens: As soon
as another onion as the expected honest processing is found,
both H∗3 and H4 continue to use the bit-identical onion for
the further processing except that with negligible probability a
collision on the O¯-list resp. O-list occurs. In case of a dropped
onion it is simply not processed further in any of the two
machines.
Note that the view of the environment in the real protocol is
the same as its view in interacting with H0. Similarly, its view
in the ideal protocol with the simulator is the same as its view
in interacting with H4. As we have shown indistinguishability
in every step, we have indistinguishability in their views.
E. Sphinx
1) Adapted Sphinx: The original Sphinx protocol was
adapted in [5] to use modern cryptographic primitives, which
can be proven secure. Further, the number of different crypto-
graphic algorithms is reduced to improve performance of the
construction. Additionally, the encryption function used for
the Sphinx payload is replaced by an authenticated encryption
(AE) scheme, such that the payload is also authenticated at
each node by the tag γi as part of the header. Let piAE (pi−1AE)
be the encryption (decryption) function of an AE scheme, as
proposed by [5].
The algorithm to generate a Sphinx packet is partly adapted.
Calculation of αi, si, bi, βi is equivalent to the original Sphinx
description, except that we consider the 0-bit string for padding
βν−1 replaced by random bits to prevent the known attack from
Section IV-A. The cryptographic primitives µ, hµ, pi, hpi are
not used anymore in the adaptation. Instead an AE scheme is
employed: Let δν be the payload of the Sphinx packet. For
0 ≤ i < ν − 1: (δi, γi) ← piAE(si, δi+1, βi), where δi is
an encryption of δi+1 and γ is a tag authenticating δi+1, βi.
piAE , ρ, hb, hρ are modelled as a random oracle. The length of
the Sphinx payload is fixed and checked at all mix nodes. If
the length is incorrect, the packet is discarded.
2) Proof of adapted Sphinx: The proof for Onion-
Correctness is analogous to the one in [13]. The proof of
our new security properties follows:
Symmetric key si is a secret: The mix nodes have an
asymmetric private key xni , that is used in a Diffie-Hellman
key exchange. It follows that the shared symmetric key between
an honest sender and an honest mix node is not known to the
adversary. If an adversary could extract the symmetric key with
non-negligible probability, she could break the decisional diffie-
hellman problem. See [13] Section 4.4, indistinguishability
proof of hybrid G1. Note that tag γ is generated using an AE
scheme keyed with si directly. The argumentation from [13]
still holds.
LU : Recall that LU allows the adversary to decide the
inputs to FormOnion and either returns the resulting onion
O1 of this FormOnion call or a randomly chosen onion O¯k,
that only matches the subpath between the honest nodes,
together with the processing of O1 after the honest node
(ProcOnion(Oj)). Furthermore, it allows oracle use before
and after this decision.
No dependencies between FormOnion: We define the game
LU1 to be the same as LU except that the adversary has
no oracle access before his input decision (skips Step 2). As
the creation of onions in Sphinx is adequately randomized,
independent from earlier creations and using a sufficiently
large security parameter, oracle access before the challenge
only negligibly improves the adversary’s success in guessing
correctly.
No modification: We define the game LU2 to be the same
as LU1 except that the adversary has no oracle access after
his input decision (skips Step 7). Using the oracle for a new
onion O˜ independent of the challenge onion O does not help
guessing b as the output ProcOnion(O˜) is then independent
from b as well. Thus, we only need to look at modifications of
the challenge onion processed until the honest node O+j :=
ProcOnionj(O). As any onion layer, O+j consists of four parts
(α, β, γ, δ), from which the tag γ authenticates β, δ using a
shared key s extracted from α. Modifications generating a
valid tag are thus only successful with negligible probability.
Therefore, there cannot be a successful attack on LU1 that
relies on the second oracle and thus any successful attack on
LU1 is also possible for LU2 in Sphinx.
No linking: We define the game LU3 to be LU2 but the
second part of the output (ProcOnion(Oj) = (Oj+1, Pj+1))
is no longer given to the game adversary. Assume knowing
this output helps the adversary to break LU . As the next hop
Pj+1 is already known to her from her choice of path, the
only part of the output that can help her is Oj+1. Thus the
adversary must be able to link Oj+1 to the first output onion
layer (O1 resp. O¯k) which differs depending on b.
Hence, she must be able to link the onion layers before and
after the honest node. The processing at a honest node changes
all four parts of a Sphinx packet in a way such that the adversary
cannot predict the result. Let B = (β‖02κ) ⊕ ρ(hρ(s)):
α′ ← αhbα,s;β′ ← B[2κ..(2r+3)κ−1]; γ′ ← B[κ..2κ−1]; δ′ ←
pi−1AE(s, δ, γ). Assume if the adversary can decide on (α, β, γ, δ)
she can distinguish any of the new values (α′, β′, γ′, δ′) from
randomness without knowing s. However, this implies that she
is able to solve the DDH problem induced by the computation
for α′, or break the secure ρ, piAE , or hash primitives, which
contradicts the assumption. Thus, no successful attack on LU2
based on the second part of the output (ProcOnion(Oj)) can
exist for Sphinx.
Onion layer indistinguishable from random ones: We define
LU4 to be LU3 except that for the output onion layer the
values of α, β, γ and δ are chosen randomly from their
corresponding spaces, such that they result in the same
subpath as given by the adversary. We show that LU4 is
indistinguishable from LU3. Assume an adversary that can
distinguish the games. As processing of onion layers results
in expected behavior, she must be able to distinguish some
of the parts of the onion layer from randomness. Assume she
can distinguish any part of the packet, that means she can
– without knowing s – either solve the DDH problem or break
the security of ρ or the AE scheme. Therefore, she cannot
distinguish any part of the packet from a randomly drawn
value, and also not process it to get the message.
In LU4 all the values are drawn exactly the same way
independent of b. There cannot be an adversary with any
advantage for this game. Because LU4 ≈ LU3 =⇒
LU2 =⇒ LU1 =⇒ LU , we have proven that any adversary
has at most negligible advantage in guessing b for LU .
TI : Recall that TI either outputs the processing of the
onion build from the adversary’s choice (ProcOnion(Oj) =
(Oj+1, Pj+1)) or the processing from a random onion that
matches the end of the path and message of the adversary’s
choice (ProcOnion(O¯k) = (O¯k+1, Pj+1)). Note that the next
hop is always the same in those outputs and thus only the onion
layers need to be indistinguishable. The proof of this is similar
to LU ’s “Onion layer indistinguishable from random ones”
except that O is chosen randomly from the onion layers that
also include the adversary chosen message. Further, thanks to
the fix to the attack determining the path length, also the values
αν−1, βν−1, γν−1, δν−1 the last node gets are indistinguishable
from such random ones.
